Bagration plan. Belarusian operation “Bagration”: lessons from history. Battles near Mogilev

Operation "Bagration"

Planning for Operation Bagration

The year 1944 came - a year of great hopes for all peoples who fell under the yoke of fascism, a year of decisive victories of the Red Army. The armed forces entered the final stage of the Great Patriotic War. June 6, 1944 I.V. Stalin, informing US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Churchill about the upcoming offensive actions of the Red Army, wrote: “The summer offensive of Soviet troops ... will begin by mid-June on one of the important sectors of the front. At the end of June and during July, offensive operations will turn during the general offensive of the Soviet troops, on April 12, at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the State Defense Committee and the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the plan for the summer-autumn campaign of 1944 was discussed. At the same meeting, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief instructed the General Staff to begin developing the general plan for the Belarusian operation, which was considered as the main military event of the summer - autumn campaign. As a result of a deep study of the situation, a comprehensive analysis of the proposals of the military councils of the fronts, an assessment of all other factors in the General Staff, the general plan of the Belarusian strategic offensive operation gradually matured and crystallized. From that moment on, the work on planning the Belarusian operation was carried out in parallel: at the General Staff and at the front headquarters.

Map of Operation Bagration

By mid-May the planning process was largely complete. In honor of the outstanding Russian commander, hero of the Patriotic War of 1812 Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration, the operation received the code name “Bagration”. In total, 2 million 400 thousand people, 5,200 tanks and self-propelled guns, 5,300 aircraft, 36,400 guns and mortars were concentrated to participate in the Belarusian operation.

The immediate goal of Operation Bagration was to defeat the main forces of the German Army Group Center, liberate the central regions of Belarus from the fascist occupiers, eliminate the Belarusian salient, and create the preconditions for subsequent offensive operations in the western regions of Ukraine, the Baltic states, East Prussia and Poland.

The plan of the Supreme High Command Headquarters included: using deep strikes on four fronts to break through the enemy’s defenses in six directions, encircle and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian salient - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, after which, attacking in converging directions towards Minsk, encircle and eliminate the main forces east of the Belarusian capital Army Group Center. According to the plan of Operation Bagration, powerful attacks from the front were to be combined with attacks from the partisans from the rear. The participation of a large army of partisans was considered a factor of operational and strategic importance.

The 1st Baltic Front was advancing on the right flank of the Belarusian salient. The front's immediate task was to break through the defenses north-west of Vitebsk, force the Western Dvina and advance on Beshenkovichi with the main forces. Front commander General I.Kh. Bagramyan decided to break through the enemy’s defenses southwest of Gorodok.

Marshal of the USSR I.Kh. Baghramyan

In the defense breakthrough area, 75% of the available rifle divisions, 78% of tanks and self-propelled guns, 76% of artillery and mortars were concentrated. This made it possible to create a superiority over the enemy in people by 3 times, in artillery and tanks - by 3-6 times. On average, there were 150 guns and mortars and 123 direct infantry support tanks per 1 km of front in breakthrough areas. In some places, a density of 290 guns and mortars was created per 1 km of front.

A particularly important role was assigned to the 3rd Belorussian Front. At the first stage of the operation, his troops had to break through the defenses in two sectors and, in cooperation with the 1st Baltic and 2nd Belorussian fronts, defeat the enemy’s Vitebsk-Orsha grouping.

To successfully complete the task, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky decided to create two strike groups of troops: northern and southern. The northern group was faced with a demand to encircle the Vitebsk group of Germans and capture Vitebsk. The southern strike group was obliged to break through the defenses and develop success along the Minsk highway in the direction of Borisov. Part of the troops of this group was allocated for the attack on Orsha.

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were advancing in the center of the Belarusian salient. The Supreme Command headquarters assigned them the task of defeating the enemy’s Mogilev group, liberating Mogilev and, building on their success to the west, reaching the Berezina River.

The front's immediate task was to reach the Dnieper and seize a bridgehead on its western bank. In the future, capture Mogilev and develop an offensive in the general direction towards Berezino and Smilovichi.

In the breakthrough area, the density of forces and means reached: 180 guns and mortars and 20 tanks per 1 km of front.

An extremely important role in Operation Bagration was assigned to the 1st Belorussian Front. Before him, the Supreme Command Headquarters put forward the task of delivering two frontal strikes, encircling and destroying the enemy’s Bobruisk group, and then developing an offensive against Osipovichi, Pukhovichi, Slutsk; part of the forces to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in the defeat of the Mogilev enemy group. During the first stage of the strategic operation, the troops of the left wing of the front were supposed to pin down the opposing forces of the Nazis and prepare for an offensive in the Lublin-Brest direction.

The troops of the shock groups were given the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses to develop an offensive in the general direction of Bobruisk and, during the first nine days of the operation, to encircle and destroy the Bobruisk group of Germans.

The defeat of the Vitebsk and Bobruisk groups and the breakthrough of Soviet troops to Orsha and Mogilev opened up the prospect of an operation to encircle and destroy large enemy forces east of Minsk.

A special role in Operation Bagration was given to Belarusian partisans. The Soviet Supreme High Command, through the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, assigned them specific tasks: to launch active combat operations behind enemy lines, disrupt his communications and communications, destroy German headquarters, disable enemy manpower and military equipment, carry out reconnaissance in the interests of the advancing fronts, capture and hold advantageous lines and bridgeheads on rivers until the approach of Soviet troops, provide support to Red Army units in the liberation of cities, railway junctions and stations, organize the protection of populated areas, disrupt the export of Soviet people to Germany, and prevent the Nazis from blowing up industrial enterprises and bridges during their retreat.

On June 7, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus reviewed and approved the plan for a new rail operation, which was developed by the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement. Strikes on railway communications were intended to paralyze enemy transportation.

Preparation for Operation Bagration

Deputy Chief of the General Staff A.I. Antonov

Starting from mid-May, military commands and headquarters, all soldiers and partisans, sparing no effort and energy, prepared for the offensive around the clock. Troops and military equipment were concentrated in the central direction, and strike groups of fronts and armies were created. superiority over the enemy.

Great attention was paid to ensuring the surprise of the operation. On May 29, 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters sent a special directive to the fronts, in which it demanded that preparations for offensive combat operations be carefully concealed from the enemy.

By order of the Supreme Command Headquarters, all local residents were temporarily evicted from the front-line zone. This was done in order to prevent the enemy from sending his agents to the front lines under the guise of indigenous residents or refugees.

Specially designated officers met the arriving troops at unloading stations and escorted them to the concentration areas, strictly demanding that they comply with all camouflage measures. Formations and units of ground forces concentrated on breakthrough areas only at night. Reconnaissance of the area in the main directions was allowed to be carried out by small groups of officers and generals dressed in the soldier's uniform of rifle troops. Tankers and aviators were prohibited from appearing at the front line in their uniforms.

The Soviet command cited many measures to disinform the enemy. In order to mislead the Nazi command and convince him that in the summer of 1944 Soviet troops would deliver the main blow in the south, the 3rd Ukrainian Front behind its right wing north of Chisinau, at the direction of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, carried out a false concentration of 9 rifle divisions, reinforced with tanks and artillery. Radio silence and the rules of covert command and control of troops were strictly observed.

All this ensured the strategic surprise of the Belarusian operation. Hitler's command was unable to reveal either the general plan of the operation, nor its scale, nor the true directions of the main attack, nor the start date of the offensive. Expecting the main strategic blow of the Red Army on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front in the summer of 1944, it held 24 of the 34 tank and motorized divisions available on the Eastern Front south of Polesie.

Before the start of the operation, issues of interaction were carefully worked out, and the combat experience gained in previous battles was summarized and brought to the attention of every soldier, sergeant and officer. Particularly much attention was paid to young soldiers who had not yet participated in battles. A lot of “wet shoes” were made - wader skis, drags for machine guns, mortars and light artillery, boats and rafts were built. The headquarters of units, formations and formations paid a lot of attention to issues of control and communications. Compared to the operations of 1943, the duration of artillery preparation increased by 30% and amounted to 120-140 minutes. Artillery support for the attack of infantry and tanks was planned to be carried out not only with a single, but also with a double fire shaft to a depth of 1.5-2 km. This was a new phenomenon in the art of war.

During the period of aviation training and air support for attacking troops, massive strikes by bombers and attack aircraft were envisaged (300-500 aircraft at a time).

The front troops did a tremendous amount of work to provide engineering support for the operation. Sapper units and formations built and repaired roads, erected bridges, and cleared the area of ​​mines.

During the preparation for the operation, military, air and human intelligence reconnaissance was intensively conducted, which helped to reveal the grouping of troops and the nature of the enemy’s defense. Particular attention was paid to military intelligence. The partisans provided enormous assistance in obtaining information about the enemy. In just 6 months of 1944, partisan intelligence officers handed over 5,865 operational documents captured from the enemy to front intelligence agencies.

On June 20, front troops took up their initial positions for the offensive and waited for the signal to begin hostilities. Units and formations lived in anticipation of great events.

The main strategic blow was delivered on the central sector of the front, in Belarus, which was determined by political, economic and military considerations.

If you look at the military map of that time, you can see that the line of the Soviet-German front, making bends, formed a huge protrusion in Belarus with an area of ​​​​about 250 thousand square meters. km, with its top facing east, which was deeply wedged into the location of Soviet troops. This ledge, or as the Nazis called it “balcony,” was of great operational and strategic importance for the enemy. The fascist German command, while holding Belarus, ensured a stable position for its troops in the Baltic states and Ukraine. The ledge covered the approaches to Poland and East Prussia. Here, on the territory of Belarus, were the shortest routes to the vital centers of Germany. The Belarusian “balcony” also hung over the right wing of the 1st Ukrainian Front. From here the enemy could launch flank attacks on our advancing troops. The fascist German aviation squadrons based on the ledge could actively operate along the communications and industrial centers of the Moscow region. In addition, the retention of Belarus made it possible for the enemy to maintain strategic interaction between army groups “North”, “Center” and “Northern Ukraine”, which fought in the center and on the flanks of the Soviet-German front

Army Group Center Command

The beginning of Operation Bagration

The collapse of the Nazis near Vitebsk

At dawn on June 23, 1944, Operation Bagration began - the decisive stage of the battle for Belarus. Before the offensive, in accordance with the plan of the Belarusian headquarters of the partisan movement, the partisans sharply intensified their struggle. On the night of June 20, behind enemy lines, explosions occurred on all railway lines. Operation Rail War has begun.

10 days before the start of Operation Bagration, long-range aviation formations joined the hostilities. They carried out massive raids on eight base airfields, where aerial reconnaissance revealed a concentration of enemy aircraft. Having carried out 1,500 sorties, Soviet pilots caused great damage to the enemy air force, which made it easier for the air armies to gain complete air supremacy from the first day of Operation Bagration.

On the morning of June 23, the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts went on the offensive, and a day later, the armies of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. The attack by strike groups on all four fronts was preceded by artillery and air preparation.

At dawn, when the east turned slightly red, the roar of artillery cannonade shook the air for tens of kilometers. The earth shook from the explosions of many mines and shells. For 120 minutes, thousands of guns and mortars destroyed German defensive fortifications, plowed up trenches, suppressed and destroyed the Nazis' fire weapons and military equipment. Hurricane artillery fire stunned the enemy. Most of the defensive structures on the main defensive line were disabled. Fire weapons, artillery and mortar batteries were largely suppressed, and troop control was disrupted.

After artillery preparation, Soviet troops went on the attack. A loud “hurray” swept over the fields of Belarus.

It seemed that after such a powerful artillery shelling of the front line and air strikes, there would be nothing alive left in the trenches. However, contrary to our expectations, the enemy troops quickly came to their senses. The Nazis urgently brought up tactical and operational reserves from the rear areas. Heavy fighting broke out. For every meter of conquered land, for every trench and every bunker, we had to actively fight and pay with considerable blood.

However, on the first day of the operation, formations of the 1st Baltic Front broke through the tactical defenses north of Vitebsk, liberated 185 settlements, and captured 372 German soldiers and officers. On the night of June 24, they reached the Western Dvina, crossed the river on the move and captured several bridgeheads on its left bank.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic Front was unexpected for the German command and its troops. General K. Tippelskirch wrote: “The offensive north-west of Vitebsk was especially unpleasant, since, unlike the attacks on the rest of the front, it was a complete surprise, hitting a particularly weakly protected section of the front in an operationally decisive direction.”

Commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal V. Model

In the Orsha direction, the troops of the 11th Guards and 31st armies met fierce resistance. The defense in the breakthrough area was full of bunkers and pillboxes. Many rifle cells and machine gun points had armored shields.

To speed up the pace of defense breakthrough, General K.N. Galitsky urgently regrouped his forces and on the second day of the operation transferred the main efforts of the army to a secondary direction, where success was evident.

At the same time, the pilots of the 1st Air Army significantly intensified their attacks. Completely dominating the air, they continuously attacked enemy troops on the battlefield. As a result, on June 24, the 11th Guards Army advanced 14 km.

Hitler's command still hoped to hold the Minsk Railway. Two infantry divisions were transferred to this direction from the reserve of Army Group Center. But these attempts were unsuccessful. The 2nd Guards Tatsinsky Tank Corps of General A.S., brought into battle in the zone of the 11th Guards Army. Burdeynogo rushed forward towards Orsha.

Excellent results were achieved by the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. On the first day of the offensive, formations of the 49th Army broke through the defenses to a depth of 5-8 km and crossed the Pronya River. In the following days, breaking the enemy's resistance, they built on their success, crossed the Resta River, penetrated the defense to a depth of 30 km, and entered the operational space, beginning the pursuit of the retreating enemy.

Events developed favorably on the left wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. By the end of the third day of the offensive, formations of the 65th Army reached the Berezina south of Bobruisk, and the 28th Army crossed the Ptich River and captured the city of Glusk.

Events developed completely differently in the Rogachev-Bobruisk direction, where the 3rd and 48th armies were advancing. Soviet troops, having encountered stubborn enemy resistance here, were able to overcome only two defense trenches on the first day of the operation. The main reasons for the failure were: poor reconnaissance of the German defensive positions, underestimation of the enemy and overestimation of one’s own forces and capabilities, overestimated breakthrough areas of rifle divisions that failed to create the necessary superiority in forces and means, low activity of aviation combat operations due to bad weather.

To rectify the situation, the front commander ordered generals A.V. Gorbatov and P.L. Romanenko bring all reserves into the battle, regroup troops and advance north of the direction of the main attack, where enemy resistance was weaker, and reach Bobruisk by June 28.

On June 26 the turning point came. The troops of the 3rd and 48th armies and the 9th Tank Corps, introduced into battle on June 25, with the support of the bomber, assault and fighter aviation corps, broke through the tactical defense. Tankers of General B.S. Bakharov on the morning of June 27 reached the eastern bank of the Berezina, cutting off the enemy’s retreat routes.

Thus, during the first two days of the offensive, the Panther defensive line, where the main forces of the Germans were located, began to crack at all seams. Only in two of the six breakthrough areas did the Nazis manage to hold the main line of defense in their hands on the first day of the offensive. But already on the second or third day they were forced to hastily roll back in all directions.

The troops of four fronts, which began offensive combat operations in a zone more than 450 km wide, with swift coordinated strikes broke through the tactical defense zone to a depth of 25-30 km, crossed a number of rivers on the move and inflicted enormous damage on the enemy in manpower and military equipment. A critical situation arose for the Nazis in all directions. The German command could not correct the situation in a short time. The road to the west was open for a rapid rush to the mobile troops of the fronts.

The success of military operations to quickly overcome positional, well-developed defenses was not accidental. Among the main factors that ensured a rapid breakthrough of the tactical defense zone were: skillful control of units and formations during the battle, clear interaction of troops, exceptionally high combat activity of Soviet soldiers, their initiative, courage and unheard-of heroism. All soldiers, sergeants and officers showed unprecedented courage and creatively solved combat missions. When breaking through the defense, the energy and pressure of the infantry, the power of artillery, the strength of tank troops, and massive air operations were well combined.

The defense breakthrough was carried out not only during the day, but also at night. For night operations, each division was assigned reinforced rifle battalions or regiments. Some divisions attacked at night with their entire strength. The continuity of the offensive did not give the enemy any respite and exhausted him.

Gaping holes appeared in the enemy's defenses. Advancing in converging directions, Soviet troops began to carry out their plan to encircle enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian salient. Powerful German bastions near Vitebsk and Bobruisk turned into traps for the Nazis. Our troops took them in iron pincers.

Already on June 25, the troops of the 43rd Army of General A.P. Beloborodov of the 1st Baltic Front and the 39th Army of General I.I. Lyudnikov of the 3rd Belorussian Front, as a result of a deep outflanking maneuver, united in the Gnezdilovichi area. Five infantry divisions of the 3rd German Tank Army with a total number of 35 thousand people found themselves in an iron ring of encirclement near Vitebsk.

The surrounded troops were immediately given an ultimatum to surrender. The Nazis asked to be given a few hours to think about it. In the presence of our soldiers, German soldiers and officers held meetings in their units. But they never came to a common decision.

When the ultimatum expired, Soviet troops went on the attack. The Nazis stubbornly resisted, trying to break through the encirclement. On June 26 alone they launched 22 counterattacks in a southwestern direction. “On the night from 25 to 26 and throughout June 26, the enemy made desperate attempts to break out of the shrinking ring and go to the southwest,” wrote the representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky.

The Nazis, accompanied by tanks and assault guns with artillery fire support, repeatedly rushed into battle. The battle here became more and more fierce every hour. The fascist troops fought with exceptional persistence. They tried to break through the encirclement at any cost. But they were unable to overcome the barriers quickly created in their path. After several volleys of Katyusha rockets and heavy artillery fire, our infantry and tanks went on the attack. To help the ground forces, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky attracted all the forces of the 1st Air Army. As a result of intense bombing strikes and continuous air assault operations, the encircled enemy suffered significant damage in manpower and equipment. The morale of his troops was completely broken, which greatly accelerated their surrender.

The surrounded group was completely defeated on June 27. The enemy lost more than 10 thousand people as prisoners alone. 17,776 prisoners, 69 tanks and assault guns, 52 artillery pieces and 514 mortars were captured...".

On June 26, 1944, the regional center of Belarus, the city of Vitebsk, was liberated from the fascist occupiers by storm. In the evening, the capital of the USSR, Moscow, saluted the soldiers of the 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian fronts, who liberated Vitebsk, with twenty artillery salvoes from 224 guns. 63 formations and units that showed high combat skill and courage during the liberation of the city were given the honorary name of Vitebsk.

Vitebsk lay in ruins. The city was destroyed by more than 90%. It was almost empty. Military journalist Lev Yushchenko, a direct participant in the battles for Vitebsk, wrote in his diary then: “June 26. Early in the morning we make our way through those streets where the shooting had already died down. A dead city. The Nazis drank blood and life from it. Dead, charred, covered in smoke houses. The pavement is overgrown with grass. Endless ruins, vacant lots, barbed wire of the camps, tall weeds... Early in the morning we did not meet a single inhabitant..." .

Bobruisk boiler

Events developed no less successfully on the left wing of the Belarusian salient, where the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front were advancing. The 9th and 1st Guards Tank Corps, brought into the battle, broke through to the rear of the enemy group and cut off all its routes of retreat.

9th Tank Corps of General B.S. Bakharov rushed at high speed along the highway to Bobruisk and by the morning of June 27 reached the eastern bank of the Berezina. By this time, tankers of the 1st Guards Tank Corps, commanded by General M.F. Panov, broke through northwest of Bobruisk. Following the tank corps, which captured the enemy in pincers, the rifle divisions of Generals A.V. quickly advanced. Gorbatova, P.L. Romanenko and P.I. Batova. In the encircled area, with a length of 25-30 km from east to west and 20-25 km from north to south, there were about six divisions with a total number of up to 40 thousand people.

The Nazis were in a feverish hurry. They sought to take advantage of the fact that the internal encirclement front in the north and north-west was held only by parts of tank corps, and that combined arms armies had not yet approached this area and had not created a strong defense.

The 9th Tank Corps, which took up defensive positions in a 19 km wide zone, found itself in a critical situation. Enemy troops attacked him from the east and south. On the afternoon of June 28, German troops began to concentrate and prepare for the attack. Not far from Titovka, the remaining enemy military equipment was concentrated: tanks, guns, vehicles, carts. The Nazis intended to launch an assault at nightfall and ram the weak defenses of the Soviet troops on the internal front of the encirclement.

General Hasso von Manteuffel with officers of the Grossdeutschland division

German tanks Pzkpfw IV

However, aerial reconnaissance discovered a concentration of fascist troops and a concentration of tanks, vehicles and artillery on the Zhlobin-Bobruisk road. Time to bring rifle divisions of combined arms armies to this area and thwart the enemy’s plans.

On the night of June 28, the Nazis could have broken out of the encirclement. In this situation, in order to quickly destroy the encircled enemy troops, representatives of the Headquarters decided to attract all the aviation forces of the 16th Air Army.

400 bombers and attack aircraft took to the air under the cover of 126 fighters. The massive raid lasted 90 minutes.

Strong fires broke out on the battlefield: many dozens of cars, tanks, fuels and lubricants were burning. The entire field is illuminated by an ominous fire. Navigating along it, more and more new echelons of our bombers approached, dropping bombs of various calibers. This entire terrible “chorus” was supplemented by artillery fire from the 48th Army. German soldiers, like madmen, rushed in all directions, and those who did not want to surrender died immediately."

An hour and a half later, already at night, the surrounded German group was attacked by 183 long-range bombers, which dropped 206 tons of bombs on the concentration of enemy troops. The pilots were preparing to carry out another combat mission, but on the orders of G.K. Zhukov were redirected to operate in the Titovka area.

“Pe-2” is attacked

As a result of massive air strikes and artillery fire raids, the encircled troops suffered enormous damage and were completely demoralized. The encirclement area looked like a huge cemetery - the corpses of Nazi soldiers and equipment mangled by the explosions of shells and aerial bombs were scattered everywhere. A specially created commission found that pilots and artillerymen, during massive attacks, destroyed at least a thousand soldiers and officers, 150 tanks and assault guns, up to 1,000 guns of various calibers, about 6 thousand vehicles and tractors, about 3 thousand carts, 1,500 horses.

In two days of fighting, the troops of the armies of generals P.I. arrived here. Batova and P.L. Romanenko liquidated the Bobruisk “cauldron” southeast of Bobruisk. Up to 6 thousand Nazis surrendered. Among them was the commander of the 35th German Army Corps, General von K. Lützow. Soviet troops captured 432 guns, 250 mortars, and more than a thousand machine guns here.

A day later, on June 29, Soviet troops defeated the enemy in the city of Bobruisk itself. The garrison of German troops in Bobruisk numbered more than 10 thousand people. By order of the city commandant, General A. Gaman, a strong all-round defense was created around Bobruisk. All streets were barricaded, stone buildings were equipped as firing points. Tanks were dug into the ground at road intersections and bunkers were built. From the air, the city was covered by heavy anti-aircraft artillery fire. The approaches to Bobruisk were mined.

In the afternoon of June 27, Soviet troops (1st Guards Tank and 35th Rifle Corps) reached the approaches to the city and started a battle on the move. However, they were not successful. All night from June 27 to 28, a battle raged on the outskirts of Bobruisk, which did not subside for a minute in the following days.

In the morning the fighting flared up with renewed vigor. Overcoming fierce German resistance, Soviet troops captured the station and defeated a 5,000-strong enemy detachment led by the commander of the 41st Tank Corps, General Hofmeister, who was attempting to break out of the encirclement. On June 29, soldiers of the 65th and 48th armies completely cleared Bobruisk of fascist occupiers.

In the area of ​​the city of Bobruisk, more than 8 thousand fascist soldiers and officers were captured. The commandant of Bobruisk, General A. Gaman, one of the fascist executioners, included in the list of war criminals by the State Commission for the Investigation of Fascist Atrocities, was also captured.

Member of the Military Council of the 3rd Belarusian Front V. Makarov, A. Vasilevsky and I. Chernyakhovsky interrogate the commander of the 53rd Army Corps F. Lollwitzer (in a cap) and the commander of the 206th Infantry Division A. Hitter (in a cap)

In the encirclement and destruction of the enemy's Bobruisk group, the rivermen of the Dnieper military flotilla played an important role. On their ships, they ensured the crossing of the Berezina by the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, stopped the enemy’s attempts to cross the river and leave the Bobruisk “cauldron”, and with their artillery and small arms participated in the defeat of the Nazis.

Defeat of Nazi troops near Orsha and Mogilev

Simultaneously with the encirclement and destruction of enemy groups near Vitebsk and Bobruisk, Soviet troops defeated the enemy near Orsha and Mogilev.

On June 26, formations of the 11th Guards and 31st armies began the assault on Orsha. The battle in the city lasted the whole day. By the morning of June 27, the enemy was defeated. The city of Orsha was completely liberated from the invaders.

During the Mogilev operation, the cities of Gorki (June 26), Kopys and Shklov (June 27) were also liberated.

The Nazis lost 6 thousand people here killed, about 3,400 prisoners, and a lot of weapons and military equipment. The commander of the 12th Infantry Division, Lieutenant General R. Bamler, and the commandant of Mogilev, Major General von Erdmansdorff, surrendered.

For skillful actions, courage and heroism of the personnel, 21 formations and units were awarded the honorary name Mogilev, and 32 - Verkhnedneprovsky. The troops who participated in the battles during the crossing of the Dnieper and the liberation of Mogilev and other cities were thanked by order of the Supreme High Command.

Five days after the liberation of Mogilev, on July 1, 1944, 25 thousand city residents gathered at the stadium. The partisans who took part in the hostilities also came here with red ribbons on their caps. A citywide rally took place.

The operation to encircle and destroy the enemy group near Vitebsk had its own characteristics. First of all, it was carried out by combined arms armies with the support of aviation without the participation of large tank formations and formations. The fighting was fleeting. Soviet troops closed the encirclement on the third day of the offensive, and completed the defeat of the encircled enemy on the fourth day. In addition, the encirclement was carried out in tactical depth, 20-35 km from the front line.

Unlike the Vitebsk operation, the encirclement of Nazi troops near Bobruisk was carried out by tank corps and mobile detachments of rifle troops, followed by the attack of the main forces of the combined arms armies.

Before the occupation by the Nazis (July 26, 1941), Mogilev was one of the most beautiful cities in Belarus, a major industrial and cultural center of the republic. During three years of occupation, the Nazis turned Mogilev into a torture chamber, killing more than 40 thousand Soviet citizens. About 30 thousand residents of the city were taken to Germany for hard labor. All educational and cultural institutions were closed. The city was half destroyed and burned.

The end of the battle is victory

Encirclement of the Nazis near Minsk

As a result of the first six days of the Red Army's offensive, Army Group Center found itself in a catastrophic situation. Its defense was crushed in all directions from the Western Dvina to Pripyat. Our troops, breaking enemy resistance, advanced 80-150 km westward from June 23 to 28, liberating dozens of cities and thousands of villages. Key enemy positions near Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk fell. 13 enemy divisions were surrounded and destroyed. By the end of June 28, both flanks of Army Group Center were bypassed by troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts. Very favorable conditions were created for launching concentric attacks in the direction of Minsk with the aim of encircling the 4th Nazi Army.

Soviet troops continued to deepen their wedges in the direction of Minsk, Slutsk and Molodechno. Decisive battles, which corresponded to the plan of the strategic operation, unfolded in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front on the Berezina River, in the Borisov region.

The powerful blow of the Soviet troops was combined with the blow of the Belarusian partisans. In no other operation of the Great Patriotic War were communications and operational interaction between partisans and front-line troops so widely and clearly organized as in Operation Bagration.

Operating in the front line, the partisans struck at enemy communications and continuously attacked retreating enemy units, exterminating manpower. They helped the advancing troops cross rivers, cleared roads, removed mines, showed secret paths for attacks on the enemy’s flanks and rear, and liberated a number of settlements, including five regional centers.

To take action against the retreating enemy troops, the main forces of front-line and long-range aviation were brought in. In order to prevent the Nazis from stopping and gaining a foothold on any line, mobile formations, like daggers, cut into their location, boldly moved further to the west, into the depths of the retreating German units, cutting off their escape routes. This frustrated the enemy’s retreat, weakened the strength of his resistance, and forced him to abandon military equipment and property. In a number of areas the retreat turned into a stampede.

By the end of July 29, favorable opportunities had been created for encircling and defeating a large fascist group in the center of Belarus. In an effort to stop the advance of the Soviet troops, the enemy hastily introduced new forces into the battle... But this did not help the enemy.

On June 28-29, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, taking into account the current situation, through private directives, clarified the tasks of the fronts for the further development of the offensive. To the troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian fronts of the generals of the ID. Chernyakhovsky and K.K. Rokossovsky was instructed to quickly reach Minsk with a two-way outflanking maneuver, capture the city and close the encirclement ring around the fascist troops retreating from Mogilev. At the same time, it was ordered that part of the troops create a strong internal front of encirclement, and with the main forces quickly advance on Molodechno and Baranovichi, form a mobile external front of encirclement, and not give the Nazi command the opportunity to bring up reserves and release the encircled group. Troops of the 1st Baltic Front under General I.Kh. Bagramyan was given the task of pursuing the enemy in the northwestern and western directions, capturing Polotsk and supporting the actions of our troops from the north, which were encircling the 4th German Army near Minsk. In front of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, commanded by General G.F. Zakharov, the task was put forward by frontal pursuit to pin down the enemy in the center of the Belarusian salient, disrupt his planned withdrawal, crush and destroy him, and facilitate the encirclement of the main forces of the 4th Army east of Minsk.

In conditions when the Nazis began to hastily retreat to the west, it was important to prevent them from gaining a foothold on pre-equipped defensive lines along the western banks of the rivers. In this regard, division and corps commanders and army commanders received orders to create maneuverable forward detachments to capture bridges and river crossings. The main forces should organize a decisive pursuit of the enemy.

On July 1, advanced units of the Soviet troops broke through to the area of ​​​​the intersection of the Minsk and Bobruisk highways and straddled the intersection. On July 2, 1944, troops of the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps and 29th Tank Corps liberated Ostroshitsky Gorodok and ensured a rapid offensive on Minsk."

Liquidation of the Minsk "cauldron"

At dawn, at three o'clock in the morning on July 3, having broken the enemy's resistance, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of General Burdeyny burst into Minsk from the northeast.

A.S. Burdeyny

Following him, the advanced units of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Marshal of Tank Forces P.A. reached the northern outskirts of the capital of Belarus. Rotmistrov. The enemy's tank units began to recapture block by block, making their way to the city center.

Marshal of Tank Forces P.A. Rotmistrov

By the end of the day on July 3, the capital of the Belarusian Republic was liberated from the occupiers by Red Army troops with the active participation of partisans.

On July 19, the government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus moved from Gomel to the capital.

On July 16, 13 days after the liberation of the capital of Belarus, columns of partisans formed on the territory of the former hippodrome and on the adjacent streets of Minsk. Then a partisan parade took place. To the sounds of a solemn march, partisans marched in front of the government rostrum and the residents of Minsk. The first to pass was the partisan brigade "People's Avengers" led by its renowned commander, Hero of the Soviet Union G.F. Pokrovsky. The parade was a worthy conclusion to the heroic epic of the partisan movement in Belarus.

By the end of July 3, the main forces of the 4th Nazi Army were cut off east of Minsk. Three army and two tank corps, which numbered more than 105 thousand people, were surrounded. Enemy Army Group Center suffered so much damage and was so demoralized that it was practically unable to correct the catastrophic situation.

General K. Tippelskirch wrote: "... the result of the offensive, which now lasted 10 days, was stunning. About 25 divisions were destroyed or surrounded. Only a few formations defending on the southern flank of the 2nd Army remained fully functional. Those who escaped destruction the remnants have almost completely lost their combat effectiveness."

The situation of the surrounded group worsened every day.

By decision of the Supreme High Command Headquarters, the task of eliminating the encircled German group near Minsk was assigned to the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Combat operations to eliminate an encircled enemy can be divided into three short periods.

The first period lasted from July 5 to July 7, when the Nazis tried to break through in an organized manner, with general leadership of the troops. On July 7, the commander of the 12th Army Corps, Lieutenant General W. Muller, gave the following order to his troops: “After weeks of heavy fighting and marches, our situation became hopeless... Therefore, I order to immediately stop the fight.”

W. Muller's order in the form of leaflets dropped from our planes and through loudspeakers was immediately communicated to the surrounded German units, and the Nazis immediately began to surrender.

Thus, during July 5-7, the encircled enemy was inflicted a significant defeat. Hitler's troops were divided into several isolated groups that had lost organization and control. Each group began to act independently.

The second period lasted two days - July 8 and 9 and was characterized by the defeat of scattered detachments hiding in the forests southeast of Minsk and trying to infiltrate the battle formations of our troops. During these days, the surrounded German troops still tried to resist. Moving along remote roads and paths, they still hoped to escape the encirclement.

The third period (from July 10 to July 13) was essentially combing the forests and catching small groups of Germans who were not already offering organized resistance. Soviet troops and partisans formed an inner ring of encirclement around individual enemy groups hiding in the forests. The outer front of the encirclement of the troops of the 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts was mobile. It was created mainly by tank formations, which continued to relentlessly pursue the enemy in a western direction. The rapid advance of the Red Army on the outer ring of encirclement made it absolutely hopeless for the enemy to escape from the Minsk “cauldron.”

The pilots of the 1st and 4th Air Armies effectively crushed the enemy. According to aerial reconnaissance, which was conducted continuously, the detected enemy groups were subjected to powerful bombers and attack aircraft, and then attacks by ground forces and partisans.

By July 13, the battles with the encircled enemy group east of Minsk were over. The fascist divisions that found themselves surrounded ceased to exist. On July 17, 1944, 57,600 Nazi soldiers and officers captured in Belarus were escorted through the central streets of Moscow.

Combat operations to encircle and destroy the enemy near Minsk, having significant features, enriched the art of war with a number of provisions. What was new was that the encirclement of a 100,000-strong group of fascist troops was carried out at great depth as a result of a skillful combination of parallel and frontal pursuit of the enemy. In the Minsk operation, a significant step forward was made in organizing interaction between the troops of the internal and external fronts of the encirclement. The outer front of the encirclement, where “the main forces of the advancing fronts were concentrated, was mobile. Our troops on the outer front did not go on the defensive, but continued to rapidly advance. This operation differed from similar encirclement operations by a significant reduction in the time required to liquidate the encircled troops (six days).

As a result of the defeat of large enemy forces near Vitebsk, Mogilev, Bobruisk and Minsk, the immediate strategic goal of Operation Bagration was achieved. The Vitebsk, Mogilev, Polotsk, Minsk and Bobruisk regions were completely liberated from the occupiers. A gigantic 400-kilometer gap appeared in the center of the strategic front, which the Nazi command was not able to fill in a short time. Soviet troops poured into this gap. The catastrophe looming over Army Group Center was becoming a reality. The prospect of further pursuing the enemy to the western state borders and delivering powerful attacks in other strategic directions and sectors of the Soviet-German front opened up before the Red Army.

Race to the beachheads

Finally, the battle waged by the 1st Belorussian Front is a completely separate story. The northern wing of the front advanced on a weak enemy without much incident.

In the swamps of Polesie, the actions of the river flotilla gave their attack its specificity. Thanks to the incredibly extensive river network and the abundance of partisans in the forests, the Russians were able to carry out a daring operation to liberate Pinsk: on July 11, landing boats, literally sneaking past German positions, landed a rifle battalion on the piers, and then delivered artillery there. The town fell into the hands of the winners like ripe fruit.

The battle of Lublin and Brest was much more dramatic. The German front was already in turmoil in Ukraine. Konev did launch the offensive that the Nazis had feared in the spring, and now Army Group Northern Ukraine was collapsing. The Wehrmacht reserves rushed across the space from Lvov to the Baltic, not having time to plug the holes, so the German corps south of Polesie, attacked by Rokossovsky’s armies on July 18, could now only watch doomedly as a steel ram flew into its forehead.

Brest in the summer of 1944

A hail of shells devastated the German trenches in the very first day, and it got to the point that the Soviet 2nd Tank Army had to catch up(!) with the infantry that had gone ahead. Since the Pripyat swamps remained behind to the right for several days, two corps - tank and horse - turned at a right angle and rushed north, towards Brest. That is, the mobile “hammer” drove the enemy in the Brest area towards the infantry “anvil” advancing from the east. On July 25, a piece of the 2nd German Army was finally pulled out of its formation.

Since the weak and previously broken parts retreated here, the cauldron quickly collapsed. On July 28, Brest along with the fortress was taken during a short assault. The breakthrough quickly turned into a beating of the runners. The Germans broke through, leaving a minimal number of prisoners, mountains of corpses and equipment. At this time, the 2nd Tank Army was advancing strictly west, towards Lublin.

Bogdanov’s army, already targeting the German rear in the Brest area, received an order from the very top, from Headquarters, turning it towards Lublin. Bogdanov himself would have preferred to receive the scalps of several more German divisions, but the plans were no longer influenced by military, but by political reasons. Stalin needed to proclaim a pro-Soviet Polish government, and he needed a large city.

The order from Headquarters sounded unambiguous: “ No later than July 26–27 this year. capture the city of Lublin, for which, first of all, use Bogdanov’s 2nd Tank Army and the 7th Guards. kk Konstantinova. This is urgently required by the political situation and the interests of an independent democratic Poland.”

Russians in Lublin

However, Bogdanov had one more task: to seize bridgeheads across the Vistula. A large river could become a serious obstacle; it had to be overcome as quickly as possible and with the least resistance from the enemy. Therefore, part of the forces of the Second Panzer attacked Dęblin and Puławy, bypassing Lublin. Having escaped to the western shore, Bogdanov could afford the most daring options of action.

The tankers rolled along the highway, crushing crowds of rear troops leaving Lublin, and began a battle for the city itself. The lack of motorized infantry prevented it from being effectively cleared; moreover, Army Commander Bogdanov, who was observing the assault from the front line, was wounded, and the army was led by Chief of Staff Radzievsky. The uprising of the Home Army began in Lublin, all parts of the army that had not fought for the city from the very beginning joined it, and by July 25, that is, on the third day of the assault, Lublin was taken along with the SS Gruppenführer, who commanded the defense, and two thousand more prisoners.

Majdanek. Shoes of camp victims

Along the way, they managed to liberate the Majdanek death camp. Driver Mikhail Gorodetsky said later: “ I had orders not to leave the car. I’m sitting in the car, and a lieutenant comes up: “Why are you sitting?!” Your brothers are there, and you are sitting in the car! Go help them out!” I took the machine gun and went.

The camp was already surrounded on all sides, the Vlasovites remained there, they surrendered. I saw terrible things in this camp! There were a lot of children behind the wire fence. Then further there, behind the wire, there were barracks, their entrance doors were walled up - people were driven in there, and they could not get out. Further on there were barrels containing human ashes; the Germans took them to their fields. In these barrels there were bones, pieces of skulls, and whatever you want. And there were so many baby strollers nearby, it’s scary to say!

In the crematorium there was one room where the dead lay, a second room where they pulled out teeth and jaws, in the third room they undressed, and in the fourth room they fired. I didn’t go to where people were being fired – I couldn’t stand it anymore. Maybe my relatives were there too. It was so hard on my soul... I couldn’t find a place for myself, I couldn’t go any further.”

Inspection of furnaces in Majdanek

However, it was not possible to cross the Vistula right away, the bridges were blown up, and the army rushed north, along the eastern bank of the river. An interesting situation arose: the tankers walked perpendicular to the infantry, crossing their line of advance.

The breakthrough to Lublin immediately sharply aggravated the situation in the eyes of the émigré Polish government. The Polish Committee of National Liberation immediately appeared in the city, a pro-Soviet organization directed and supported from Moscow. Unlike the emigrants, the new government was located in Poland and controlled a significant part of it.

Meanwhile, the infantry captured bridgeheads on the Vistula. The enemy was weak, in some places simply absent. Two bridgeheads were captured at once - at Magnushev and Pulawa. Only the 1st Army of the Polish Army failed.

The Red Army crosses the Vistula

If the Soviet side had to simply change plans on the fly, then the Germans were faced with a catastrophe and had to patch up the destroyed front at a fire rate. The commander of Army Group Center, Walter Model, used reserves to restore the integrity of his defensive lines, fortunately the Reich General Staff, realizing the scale of the threat, began to throw divisions to the front like coal into the furnace of a steam locomotive. In particular, Model received a whole package of tank formations from the rear and other fronts.

These reserves included the army's tank divisions, the SS Viking and Totenkopf (Totenkopf) divisions, and the Hermann Göring "tank-parachute" division. Model intended to use these forces for a strong counterattack on the flank of the Soviet vanguards and restore the situation.

However, while the reserves were moving forward and concentrating, Model needed to plug the void gaping in the battle formations between Radom and Warsaw in any way. While this hole was plugged by the 9th Field Army. This army had to be reassembled after the death of its main forces in the Bobruisk pocket at the end of June, so at the end of July it was a pitiful sight.

"Panther"SS Panzer Division "Wiking" near Warsaw, August 1944

Model deployed his mobile reserves on the eastern bank of the Vistula, and their concentration had to be somehow covered. The 73rd Infantry Division and the already arrived Hermann Goering units - a reconnaissance battalion and part of the artillery - were assigned to this role. All of them were brought together into the “Franek Group,” named after the commander, Austrian General Franek. These troops occupied defenses in the Garwolin area, south of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula, facing south. Before the arrival of fresh reserves, they had to survive a powerful blow from the tank army.

On the evening of July 26, the motorcycle vanguard of Radzievsky’s army reached Garwolin and immediately began the battle. Following him, two tank corps quickly converged with the enemy. Radzievsky had 549 tanks and self-propelled guns and, thus, could deliver a fairly powerful blow. Garwolin himself was attacked by small forces, just one motorized rifle brigade; the main attacks fell on the flanks of Franek’s group. The German positions to the west and east of Garwolin were defeated, and in order not to be surrounded, the Germans retreated to the north. Meanwhile, reinforcements, new Goering units and tanks of the 19th Division flowed to Franek in a thin stream.

The German infantry was gradually removed from the board: one of the regiments of Franek's group was already defeated, the rest suffered heavy losses. The Germans countered the Russian breakthrough mainly with scattered combat groups, assembled on the fly from suitable units of tank divisions.

The approach of the third corps of Radzievsky's army especially worsened the position of the Germans. With constant counterattacks, they were still able to hold back the Russian advance, but throwing reserves into battle “from the wheels” led to high losses. Despite the fact that the Germans gradually acquired a numerical advantage in infantry and artillery, and their armored fist was constantly increasing, the disorganization of the defense and the conduct of the battle by battle groups assembled on the fly cost them dearly. The front of Franek’s group crumbled, he himself was captured, but the arriving reserves already allowed the Germans to hope to turn the tide of the battle.

Interrogation of General Franek

On July 30, Radzievsky made a controversial and risky decision, one of the most important for the course and outcome of the battle: the 3rd Tank Corps, which was advancing most successfully, was thrown into a breakthrough to Volomin and Radzimin, to the west. The corps had to go deep around Warsaw from the east. The advantage of this plan was the deep coverage of the German positions, but the 3rd Panzer Corps had to fan out in the enemy rear, while German battle groups continued to accumulate on its flanks. Moreover, Franek’s battered group was reinforced with a scattering of units, including infantry battalions, sappers, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank self-propelled guns. Radzievsky missed the moment when the reserves approaching the Germans led to a qualitative change in the situation.

By this time, the Germans already had a significant numerical advantage. The group accumulated by Model numbered more than fifty thousand people with six hundred tanks in two buildings. By the way, for five tank and infantry divisions, as well as numerous reinforcement units in the Warsaw area, this is still very little, and this situation reflects, on the one hand, losses, and on the other hand, the still incomplete concentration of divisions in the battle area.

Walter Model

The Russians could oppose them with only 32 thousand soldiers and several more than four hundred combat vehicles. The Soviet tank corps - except for the 3rd - were already bogged down in the German defense. Model understood that he had a chance to carry out an effective counteroffensive.

On the afternoon of July 30, one of the brigades of the 3rd Panzer Corps, deep in the German defense, was unexpectedly attacked in the flank. By this time, the corps was already cut off from the main forces of the army. Radzievsky did not order him to retreat, counting on the rapid approach of the rifle divisions, but now the Germans were counterattacking along the entire front, and events developed faster than the Soviet commander expected. On the 30th, he set offensive tasks and planned an assault on Prague, an eastern Warsaw suburb, and on July 31, German counterattacks fell on Soviet troops from all sides.

At this time, in Warsaw, the leaders of the local armed underground were preparing to implement the “Storm” plan. The essence of this plan was the delicate timing: it was necessary to start an uprising after the collapse of the German defense, but before the arrival of Soviet troops, and to seize power in the Polish capital. From the occupied city it seemed that now was the time.

The beginning of the Warsaw Uprising: Poles from the Home Army boast of an expropriated SS armband. The faces are still confident, everyone is sure that things are going well

During the 20th, the police and Volksdeutschi fled from Warsaw. On July 31, Antoni "Monter" Chrusciel, commander of the Polish partisans in Warsaw, personally traveled to Prague, on the eastern bank of the Vistula. The fighting was already five kilometers from Warsaw, the cannonade was clearly audible, and individual Soviet tanks even made their way into Prague, although they were driven back or burned. As a result, Monter decided that it was time to speak out, and the uprising in Warsaw began on the 2nd.

Meanwhile, already on July 31, there was no talk of a breakthrough to Prague for the Russians. The 3rd Panzer Corps was exhausted under the blows of Wehrmacht and SS tank battalions advancing from all sides. At dawn on August 1, the army received an order to go on the defensive, but it was already actually defending itself.

On August 2, German attacks from all sides forced the 3rd Corps to surrender Radzimin. The desperate fighting did not stop, the corps stood up like a hedgehog and fought off the Germans advancing across the sun-hot plains. On August 2 and 3, two brigades of the corps were completely surrounded. The commanders of both brigades were killed. The Germans desperately sought to completely destroy the main forces of the 3rd Corps.

SS tank (Totenkopf division) during fighting in Eastern Poland

However, the defeat of those surrounded in the cauldron did not take place. Outside, the 8th Guards Tank Corps cut a narrow corridor towards the encircled people. On the night of August 4, the last large groups of encirclements reached the positions of the 8th Corps. Both battered brigades were withdrawn to the rear for restoration, the remaining brigades were subordinated to the 8th. We must pay tribute to the army command: a search and rescue operation was even organized in order to pull out the remaining groups of those breaking out of the cauldron. However, saving those surrounded did not mean stopping the battle.

The Second Tank Army was greatly helped by changes in other sectors of the front. On August 1, Chuikov’s army captured a bridgehead at Magnushev to the south, and Model had to transfer part of his forces there from Warsaw. The riflemen of the Soviet 47th Army and the cavalry of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps approached the battle site.

Fresh large connections turned the tide. There were not enough reinforcements to defeat the German divisions, but all subsequent German attacks crashed against the Russian defenses in the Okunev area. On August 8, the unsuccessful butting stopped. Soon, both corps, which escaped encirclement, were transferred to other areas to defend against German counterattacks, surrendering positions in the Warsaw area to infantry. For several weeks there was a lull on the approaches to the Polish capital.

The Battle of Warsaw is important in several respects. Firstly, Model managed to prevent a new collapse of the front line of Army Group Center. The field marshal used all his available – very numerous – reserves and saved the Wehrmacht from a new catastrophe, putting a certain limit on the phenomenal successes of the Russians in Operation Bagration. On the other hand, this battle demonstrated that the advantage of the Wehrmacht at the tactical level is a thing of the past: neither numerical superiority nor the presence of numerous Panthers helped destroy the encircled brigades, and in general for a 50,000-strong group advancing on a 30,000-strong Soviet army , such limited success looks frankly pale.

For the Russians, such an unpleasant slap in the face turned out to be a demonstration of how harmful it is to get carried away with a reckless offensive in conditions of unknown enemy forces and separation from the main forces of the front. However, the 2nd Tank Army showed the ability to cope with a difficult crisis and, on the whole, proved itself to be a tough nut that the enemy never managed to crack.

Rokossovsky in Polish uniform

Finally, the Battle of Warsaw proved fatal to the Home Army uprising in the Polish capital. The plan for the performance was entirely based on the fact that the Russians would quickly knock out the Germans from the outskirts of Warsaw, but the abrupt stop of the offensive of Radzievsky’s army literally a few hours before the start of the uprising led to the fact that the Poles were left alone with punitive SS units and, after a long painful siege, were destroyed.

However, the latter turned out to be for the better for the interests of Russians in the post-war world, so the question is whether it’s worth getting very upset about this - approx. ed.

At this time, the Germans were trying to throw the enemy off the bridgeheads beyond the Vistula. Although the beachheads were attacked with all vigor, the fighting eventually degenerated into frontal attacks. These battles were costly for the Soviet troops: the 8th Guards Army lost 35 thousand people at Magnushev, significantly more than a year later at Berlin.

However, German forces were exhausted. Both sides were no longer able to continue major battles in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Operation Bagration is over.

Render unto them according to the works of their hands

The battle in Belarus turned into a complete disaster for the Wehrmacht. Within two months, the Germans lost several hundred thousand people killed and captured (the numbers are given differently, but usually from 300 to 500 thousand soldiers). For the Red Army, this grandiose massacre was also not an easy walk: about 180 thousand Red Army soldiers died. However, the result was almost incredible.

All the Wehrmacht's chances of reducing the war to a draw evaporated. In two months, all of Belarus, part of Ukraine, eastern Poland, and part of the Baltic states were liberated. The success caused a domino collapse of the German front: after such losses, the Wehrmacht could not patch up the holes anywhere, the Reich’s reserves showed the bottom: the triumph of “Bagration” helped both the troops breaking through Ukraine and advancing in the Baltic states. The general depletion of reserves affected even the front in Romania and, perhaps, the Western Front. Mutual the impact of the Belarusian operation and the Normandy landings is often underestimated, and meanwhile, operations at opposite ends of Europe had a crushing cumulative effect: the Nazis could not concentrate forces anywhere and failed everywhere.

The Germans in East Prussia are building fortifications that will not help anyway

The Germans lost a lot of experienced soldiers and commanders. Many of the divisions destroyed in Belarus, and senior officers killed or captured there, fought on the Eastern Front from the very beginning. For example, the 45th Infantry Division, destroyed in the Bobruisk pocket, stormed the Brest Fortress in June 1941. Georg Pfeiffer, commander of the 6th Corps, who died near Vitebsk, was also a veteran who participated in the battle for Kyiv in 1941.

The armies in the central direction were never able to recover from the blow of the summer of 1944, either quantitatively or qualitatively. In January 1945, when the Vistula-Oder operation began, the Germans in this area were still very weak.

If we talk about the reasons that led to such success, we can state: the most important stage of the battle is preparation for it. Through a series of events, the Russians created a completely wrong impression on the enemy about their plans. The Nazis were deceived and dealt a crushing blow in a direction that they considered secondary. As a result, the battle was won before it even began. The question was only what exactly the Wehrmacht catastrophe would look like, but no longer whether there would be a catastrophe as such. The tactical skill of the Russians had grown enough to successfully implement the strategic idea, and the industry operating at full speed made it possible to literally overwhelm the enemy with a mass of equipment and shells.

The commander's steps thundered louder. The Reich, suffering defeat after defeat in the west and east, was sliding towards a sad ending.

A unit of the 3rd Belorussian Front crosses the Luchesa River.
June 1944

This year marks 70 years since the Red Army carried out one of the largest strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War - Operation Bagration. During it, the Red Army not only liberated the people of Belarus from occupation, but also, having significantly undermined the enemy’s forces, brought closer the collapse of fascism - our Victory.

Unparalleled in spatial scope, the Belarusian offensive operation is rightfully considered the largest achievement of Russian military art. As a result, the most powerful group of the Wehrmacht was defeated. This became possible thanks to the unparalleled courage, heroism of determination and self-sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers and partisans of Belarus, many of whom died a brave death on Belarusian soil in the name of Victory over the enemy.

Map of the Belarusian operation

After the offensive in the winter of 1943-1944. the front line formed a huge protrusion in Belarus with an area of ​​​​about 250 thousand square meters. km, with its top facing east. It penetrated deeply into the location of Soviet troops and had important operational and strategic significance for both sides. The elimination of this protrusion and the liberation of Belarus opened the shortest route to Poland and Germany for the Red Army, threatening flank attacks by the enemy Army Groups “North” and “Northern Ukraine”.

In the central direction, the Soviet troops were opposed by Army Group Center (3rd Tank, 4th, 9th and 2nd Armies) under the command of Field Marshal E. Bush. It was supported by aviation of the 6th and partially of the 1st and 4th air fleets. In total, the enemy group included 63 divisions and 3 infantry brigades, which numbered 800 thousand people, 7.6 thousand guns and mortars, 900 tanks and assault guns and more than 1,300 combat aircraft. Army Group Center's reserve included 11 divisions, most of which were deployed to fight against the partisans.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1944, the Supreme Command Headquarters planned to conduct a strategic operation for the final liberation of Belarus, in which troops from 4 fronts were to act in concert. Troops of the 1st Baltic (commanding army general), 3rd (commanding colonel general), 2nd (commander colonel general G.F. Zakharov) and 1st Belorussian fronts (commanding army general) were involved in the operation. , Long-Range Aviation, the Dnieper Military Flotilla, as well as a large number of formations and detachments of Belarusian partisans.

Commander of the 1st Baltic Front, Army General
THEIR. Bagramyan and Chief of Staff of the Front, Lieutenant General
V.V. Kurasov during the Belarusian operation

The fronts included 20 combined arms, 2 tank and 5 air armies. In total, the group consisted of 178 rifle divisions, 12 tank and mechanized corps and 21 brigades. Air support and air cover for front troops was provided by 5 air armies.

The plan of the operation included deep strikes on 4 fronts to break through enemy defenses in 6 directions, encircle and destroy enemy groups on the flanks of the Belarusian salient - in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk, and then, attacking in converging directions towards Minsk, encircle and eliminate them east of the Belarusian capital the main forces of Army Group Center. In the future, increasing the impact force, reach the line Kaunas - Bialystok - Lublin.

When choosing the direction of the main attack, the idea of ​​​​concentrating forces in the Minsk direction was clearly expressed. The simultaneous breakthrough of the front in 6 sectors led to the dissection of the enemy’s forces and made it difficult for him to use reserves when repelling the offensive of our troops.

To strengthen the group, the Headquarters in the spring and summer of 1944 replenished the fronts with four combined arms, two tank armies, four breakthrough artillery divisions, two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, and four engineer brigades. In the 1.5 months preceding the operation, the size of the group of Soviet troops in Belarus increased by more than 4 times in tanks, almost 2 times in artillery, and by two-thirds in aircraft.

The enemy, not expecting large-scale actions in this direction, hoped to repel a private offensive of Soviet troops with forces and means of Army Group Center, located in one echelon, mainly only in the tactical defense zone, which consisted of 2 defensive zones with a depth of 8 to 12 km . At the same time, using the terrain favorable for defense, he created a multi-line, deeply echeloned defense, consisting of several lines, with a total depth of up to 250 km. Defense lines were built along the western banks of the rivers. The cities of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Borisov, Minsk were turned into powerful defense centers.

By the beginning of the operation, the advancing troops numbered 1.2 million people, 34 thousand guns and mortars, 4070 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and about 5 thousand combat aircraft. Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 4.4 times, in tanks and self-propelled artillery units by 4.5 times, and in aircraft by 3.6 times.

In none of the previous offensive operations did the Red Army have such a quantity of artillery, tanks and combat aircraft, and such superiority in forces, as in the Belarusian one.

The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters defined the tasks for the fronts as follows:

Troops of the 1st Baltic Front break through the enemy’s defenses northwest of Vitebsk, capture the Beshenkovichi region, and part of the forces, in cooperation with the right-flank army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Vitebsk region. Subsequently, develop an offensive against Lepel;

The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 1st Baltic Front and the 2nd Belorussian Front, defeat the Vitebsk-Orsha enemy group and reach the Berezina. To accomplish this task, the front had to strike in two directions (with the forces of 2 armies in each): on Senno, and along the Minsk highway to Borisov, and with part of the forces - on Orsha. The main forces of the front must develop an offensive towards the Berezina River;

The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the left wing of the 3rd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, defeat the Mogilev group, liberate Mogilev and reach the Berezina River;

Troops of the 1st Belorussian Front defeat the enemy group in Bobruisk. To this end, the front had to deliver two strikes: one from the Rogachev area in the direction of Bobruisk, Osipovichi, the second from the lower Berezina area to Starye Dorogi, Slutsk. At the same time, the troops of the right wing of the front were to assist the 2nd Belorussian Front in the defeat of the enemy’s Mogilev group;

The troops of the 3rd and 1st Belorussian Fronts, after the defeat of the enemy's flank groupings, were to develop an offensive in converging directions towards Minsk and, in cooperation with the 2nd Belorussian Front and partisans, encircle its main forces east of Minsk.

The partisans were also given the task of disorganizing the work of the enemy rear, disrupting the supply of reserves, capturing important lines, crossings and bridgeheads on rivers, and holding them until the approach of the advancing troops. The first rail demolition took place on the night of June 20.

Much attention was paid to concentrating aviation efforts on the direction of the main attacks of the fronts and maintaining air supremacy. Just on the eve of the offensive, aviation carried out 2,700 sorties and carried out powerful aviation training in areas where fronts were broken through.

The duration of artillery preparation was planned from 2 hours to 2 hours 20 minutes. Support for the attack was planned using the methods of a barrage of fire, sequential concentration of fire, as well as a combination of both methods. In the offensive zones of the 2 armies of the 1st Belorussian Front, operating in the direction of the main attack, support for the attack of infantry and tanks was carried out for the first time using the method of a double barrage.

At the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. Chief of Staff Colonel General M.S. is on the phone. Malinin, far left - front commander, Army General K.K. Rokossovsky. Bobruisk region. Summer 1944

Coordination of the actions of the front troops was entrusted to representatives of the Headquarters - the Chief of the General Staff of the Marshal of the Soviet Union and the Deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Marshal of the Soviet Union. For the same purpose, the head of the operational department of the General Staff, General, was sent to the 2nd Belorussian Front. The actions of the air armies were coordinated by Air Chief Marshal A.A. Novikov and Air Marshal F.Ya. Falaleev. Artillery Marshal N.D. arrived from Moscow to assist the artillery commanders and staffs. Yakovlev and Colonel General of Artillery M.N. Chistyakov.

To carry out the operation, 400 thousand tons of ammunition, about 300 thousand tons of fuel, and over 500 thousand tons of food and fodder were required, which were supplied in a timely manner.

According to the nature of the combat operations and the content of the tasks, Operation Bagration is divided into two stages: the first - from June 23 to July 4, 1944, during which 5 front-line operations were carried out: Vitebsk-Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk, and the second - from July 5 to August 29, 1944, which included 5 more front-line operations: Siauliai, Vilnius, Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin-Brest.

The 1st stage of Operation Bagration included a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses to the entire tactical depth, expansion of the breakthrough towards the flanks and the defeat of the nearest operational reserves and the capture of a number of cities, incl. liberation of the capital of Belarus - Minsk; Stage 2 - developing success in depth, overcoming intermediate defensive lines, defeating the enemy's main operational reserves, capturing important positions and bridgeheads on the river. Vistula. Specific tasks for the fronts were determined at a depth of up to 160 km.

The offensive of the troops of the 1st Baltic, 3rd and 2nd Belorussian fronts began on June 23. A day later, troops of the 1st Belorussian Front joined the battle. The offensive was preceded by reconnaissance in force.

The actions of the troops during Operation Bagration, like in no other operation of the Soviet troops before, almost exactly corresponded to its plan and the tasks received. During 12 days of intense fighting in the first stage of the operation, the main forces of Army Group Center were defeated.

German captured soldiers of Army Group Center are escorted through Moscow.
July 17, 1944

The troops, having advanced 225-280 km at an average daily pace of 20-25 km, liberated most of Belarus. In the areas of Vitebsk, Bobruisk and Minsk, a total of about 30 German divisions were surrounded and defeated. The enemy front in the central direction was crushed. The results achieved created the conditions for a subsequent offensive in the Siauliai, Vilnius, Grodno and Brest directions, as well as for the transition to active operations in other sectors of the Soviet-German front.

Fighter, liberate your Belarus. Poster by V. Koretsky. 1944

The goals set for the fronts were fully achieved. The headquarters used the success of the Belarusian operation in a timely manner for decisive actions in other directions of the Soviet-German front. On July 13, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive. The general offensive front expanded from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians. On July 17-18, Soviet troops crossed the state border of the Soviet Union with Poland. By August 29, they reached the line - Jelgava, Dobele, Augustow and the Narev and Vistula rivers.

Vistula River. Tank crossing. 1944

Further development of the offensive with an acute lack of ammunition and fatigue of the Soviet troops would not have been successful, and they, by order of Headquarters, went on the defensive.

2nd Belorussian Front: front commander army general
G.F. Zakharov, member of the Military Council, Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin and Colonel General K.A. Vershinin discuss a plan for an air strike against the enemy. August 1944

As a result of the Belarusian operation, favorable conditions were created not only for launching new powerful attacks on enemy groups operating on the Soviet-German front in the Baltic states, East Prussia and Poland, in the Warsaw-Berlin direction, but also for the deployment of offensive operations by Anglo-American troops, landed in Normandy.

The Belarusian offensive operation of a group of fronts, which lasted 68 days, is one of the outstanding operations not only of the Great Patriotic War, but also of the entire Second World War. Its distinctive feature is its enormous spatial scope and impressive operational and strategic results.

Military Council of the 3rd Belorussian Front. From left to right: Chief of Staff of the Front, Colonel General A.P. Pokrovsky, member of the Front Military Council, Lieutenant General V.E. Makarov, commander of the front troops, Army General I.D. Chernyakhovsky. September 1944

The Red Army troops, having launched an offensive on June 23 on a front of 700 km, by the end of August advanced 550 - 600 km to the west, expanding the front of military operations to 1100 km. The vast territory of Belarus and a significant part of eastern Poland were cleared of German occupiers. Soviet troops reached the Vistula, the approaches to Warsaw and the border with East Prussia.

Battalion commander of the 297th Infantry Regiment of the 184th Division of the 5th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Captain G.N. Gubkin (right) with officers on reconnaissance. On August 17, 1944, his battalion was the first in the Red Army to break through to the border of East Prussia

During the operation, the largest German group suffered a crushing defeat. Of the 179 divisions and 5 brigades of the Wehrmacht then operating on the Soviet-German front, 17 divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed in Belarus, and 50 divisions, having lost more than 50% of their personnel, lost their combat effectiveness. German troops lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers.

Operation Bagration showed vivid examples of the high skill of Soviet commanders and military leaders. She made significant contributions to the development of strategy, operational art and tactics; enriched the art of war with the experience of encircling and destroying large enemy groups in a short time and in a wide variety of environmental conditions. The task of breaking through the enemy’s powerful defenses, as well as quickly developing success in operational depth through the skillful use of large tank formations and formations, was successfully solved.

In the struggle for the liberation of Belarus, Soviet soldiers showed massive heroism and high combat skill. 1,500 of its participants became Heroes of the Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands were awarded orders and medals of the USSR. Among the Heroes of the Soviet Union and those awarded were soldiers of all nationalities of the USSR.

Partisan formations played an extremely important role in the liberation of Belarus.

Parade of partisan brigades after liberation
capital of Belarus - Minsk

Solving problems in close cooperation with the Red Army troops, they destroyed over 15 thousand and captured more than 17 thousand enemy soldiers and officers. The Motherland highly appreciated the feat of the partisans and underground fighters. Many of them were awarded orders and medals, and 87 who distinguished themselves became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

But the victory came at a high price. At the same time, the high intensity of combat operations, the enemy's advance transition to defense, difficult conditions in the wooded and swampy terrain, and the need to overcome large water barriers and other natural obstacles led to large losses in people. During the offensive, the troops of the four fronts lost 765,815 people killed, wounded, missing and sick, which is almost 50% of their total strength at the beginning of the operation. And irretrievable losses amounted to 178,507 people. Our troops also suffered heavy losses in weapons.

The world community appreciated the events in the central sector of the Soviet-German front. Western political and military figures, diplomats and journalists noted their significant influence on the further course of World War II. “The speed of the advance of your armies is amazing,” wrote the President of the United States of America F. Roosevelt on July 21, 1944. I.V. Stalin. In a telegram to the head of the Soviet government on July 24, British Prime Minister William Churchill called the events in Belarus “victories of enormous importance.” One of the Turkish newspapers stated on July 9: “If the Russian advance develops at the same pace, Russian troops will enter Berlin faster than the Allied forces will complete operations in Normandy.”

Professor at the University of Edinburgh, a well-known English expert on military-strategic problems, J. Erickson, in his book “The Road to Berlin,” emphasized: “The defeat of Army Group Center by Soviet troops was their greatest success, achieved... as a result of one operation. For the German army... it was a catastrophe of unimaginable proportions, greater than Stalingrad.”

Operation Bagration was the first major offensive operation of the Red Army, carried out during the period when the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain began military operations in Western Europe. However, 70% of the Wehrmacht's ground forces continued to fight on the Soviet-German front. The disaster in Belarus forced the German command to transfer large strategic reserves here from the west, which, of course, created favorable conditions for the offensive actions of the Allies after the landing of their troops in Normandy and the waging of the coalition war in Europe.

The successful offensive of the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and 1st Belorussian fronts in the western direction in the summer of 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front and led to a sharp weakening of the Wehrmacht's combat potential. Having eliminated the Belarusian salient, they eliminated the threat of flank attacks from the north for the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which were conducting an offensive in the Lvov and Rava-Russian directions. The capture and retention of bridgeheads on the Vistula by Soviet troops in the Pulawy and Magnuszew areas opened up prospects for new operations to defeat the enemy with the goal of completely liberating Poland and attacking the German capital.

Memorial complex "Mound of Glory".

Sculptors A. Bembel and A. Artimovich, architects O. Stakhovich and L. Mickiewicz, engineer B. Laptsevich. The total height of the memorial is 70.6 m. The earthen hill, 35 m high, is crowned with a sculptural composition of four bayonets, lined with titanium, each 35.6 m high. The bayonets symbolize the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belarusian and 1st Baltic fronts that liberated Belarus. Their base is surrounded by a ring with bas-relief images of Soviet soldiers and partisans. On the inside of the ring, made using the mosaic technique, there is the text: “Glory to the Soviet Army, the Liberator Army!”

Sergey Lipatov,
Researcher at the Scientific Research Institute
Institute of Military History of the Military Academy
General Staff of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation .

Operation Bagration is considered one of the largest military operations in the history of mankind.

It represents the third stage of the “Rail War”, which took place in June and August 1944 on the territory of Belarus.

During this operation, the German troops were dealt such a strong blow that they could no longer recover from it.

Prerequisites

At that time, the Germans were advancing on several fronts. On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, Soviet troops managed to accomplish the unprecedented: liberate almost the entire territory of the republic and destroy a huge number of Nazi troops.

But on Belarusian territory the Red Army was unable to organize a successful breakthrough to Minsk for a long time. The German forces were lined up in a wedge directed towards the USSR, and this wedge stood at the line Orsha - Vitebsk - Mogilev - Zhlobin.

Belarusian operation photo

At the same time, part of the troops was transferred to Ukraine, which the Wehrmacht still hoped to recapture. Therefore, the General Staff and the Supreme High Command decided to change the direction of action and concentrate efforts on the liberation of Belarus.

Strengths of the parties

The offensive in Belarus was organized on four fronts. Soviet troops were opposed here by four German armies:

• 2nd Army of the “Center”, located in the area of ​​Pinsk and Pripyat;
• 9th Army of the “Center”, located in the Berezina area near Bobruisk;
• 4th Army of the “Center” - the space between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers and between Bykhov and Orsha;
• 3rd Tank Army of the “Center” - there, as well as Vitebsk.

Progress of the operation

Operation Bagration was very large-scale and was carried out in two stages. At the first stage, actions were carried out on Belarusian territory, and at the second - on the territory of Lithuania and Eastern Poland.

On June 22, 1944, reconnaissance in force began to clarify the precise location of enemy guns. And on the morning of June 23, the operation itself began. Soviet troops surrounded a group of five divisions near Vitebsk and liquidated it on June 27. Thus, the main defensive forces of the Army Center were destroyed.

In addition to the actions of the Red Army, Operation Bagration was accompanied by unprecedented partisan activity: during the summer of 1944, almost 195 thousand partisans joined the Red Army.

Soviet troops in attack photo

Eike Middeldorf noted that “Russian partisans” carried out more than ten thousand explosions on railways and other communications, which delayed the movement of German troops for several days. On the other hand, partisan actions facilitated the offensive actions of the Soviet army.

The partisans planned to carry out much more explosions - up to forty thousand, however, what was done was enough to deal a crushing blow to the German side.

Polish Committee of National Liberation

At the height of Bagration, Soviet troops entered Polish territory. There they formed a provisional government, which many experts regard as a puppet government. The provisional government, called the Polish Committee of National Liberation, did not take into account the emigrant Polish government and consisted of communists and socialists. Subsequently, some of the emigrants joined the Committee, but the rest decided to remain in London.

Result of the operation

Operation Bagration exceeded all the expectations of the Soviet command. The Red Army showed the superiority of its military theory and demonstrated careful organization and consistency of action. Many believe that the defeat of the Germans on the Belarusian front is the largest in the entire history of World War II.