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2nd Ukrainian Front

CONTINUATION OF THE OFFENSIVE BY THE FORCES OF THE 2ND UKRAINIAN FRONT

From the memoirs of Colonel General Shtemenko, who was at that time the first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, it becomes clear how the General Staff reacted to the suspension of the offensive of the 46th Army. Since no one would dare cancel Stalin's order or change it in any way, the only solution was to expand the offensive front and try to capture Budapest by enveloping it from two sides, abandoning frontal attacks. The 6th Guards Tank Army and the 7th Army were given the task of breaking through enemy defenses in the Hatvan area from the east and reaching the Danube north of Budapest in the Vaca area. The troops of the 46th Army were supposed to cross the Danube in the Shorokshara area, capture the island of Csepel, continue crossing the Old Danube and attack the capital from the south-west, from the area of ​​​​the city of Erd. On November 5, the Soviet side stopped the frontal offensive southeast of Budapest in order to regroup its troops and prepare them for an operation to cover the city. This meant that from now on strategic command would pass into the hands of military professionals.

A section of the front in the Pest region from November 3 to November 15, 1944, as well as the Attila line.

At the same time, in early November, the High Command of the German Ground Forces deployed three tank corps in such a way that they blocked the approaches to Budapest. The III Panzer Corps, under the command of General Breit, was to engage in the direct defense of the Hungarian capital, while the IV Panzer Corps was to go to the Jasberen area, and the LVII Panzer Corps to the Cegled and Szolnok area. These two tank corps were supposed to launch counterattacks against the advancing enemy. After Soviet troops crossed the Tisza, the 7th Guards Army on the left wing of the advancing 2nd Ukrainian Front, as well as the 53rd, 27th, 40th armies and the Pliev cavalry mechanized group were stopped during the development of the offensive to the north by the German and Hungarian in parts. Malinovsky's mobile troops again suffered heavy losses. According to the German command, between October 31 and November 12, 132 Soviet tanks were destroyed.

Starting on November 8, the 7th Guards Army and Pliev's cavalry-mechanized group resumed their offensive on Ishaseg and Hatvan. Here, to the east and northeast of Budapest, a section of approximately 50 km of front was defended only by a few Hungarian battalions and units of the German 13th Panzer, 4th and 18th SS Motorized Divisions and 46th Infantry Division. Demoralized by the incessant Russian attacks, many soldiers of the motorized SS divisions who had been mobilized by force surrendered or dispersed. The condition of these troops is characterized by the following report: “The 18th SS Motorized Division... was recruited from ethnic Germans living in Hungary. They run over to the enemy, and the combat value of this division is similar to the Hungarian division... The total strength is 18 thousand people, with one rifle per 18 soldiers.”

It is not surprising that the untrained and poorly equipped SS soldiers were seized with panic. They could only watch as their comrades were crushed by T-34 tanks before they could find cover. Nevertheless, the command of Army Group South blamed them for the incident. In a report addressed to Guderian, Friessner writes: “In the 4th SS Motorized Police Division, the commanders of some units chose to shoot themselves due to the flight of their soldiers. The 18th SS Motorized Division was completely destroyed."

The Hungarian 12th Reserve Division, which consisted of approximately 2 thousand soldiers and officers and 20 guns and was still in the process of formation, received the combat mission in early November to cover the approaches to Budapest along the line between Pecel, Iszaseg and slightly to the south, in area of ​​the town of Dan. When the command realized that these forces were clearly not enough, the 1st parachute battalion under the command of Major Edomer Tassonyi was transferred here on November 13. Until the arrival of 600 reinforcements on November 15, the paratroopers, with well-organized artillery support, independently held a 5 to 6 km long defense area, repelling a number of fierce attacks by Soviet troops. Somehow, as a result of another frantic attack, Soviet infantrymen reached the Hungarian positions. Tashsonyi recalls:

“I turned to the German artillery spotter:

Fire to kill in sector “A”, immediately!

But these are your positions.

Doesn't matter, hurry up!

I looked at my watch. After 17 seconds, our positions and the area in front of them were under fire from 52 artillery barrels, which gradually died down and after a few minutes became very rare. This shaft hit directly at the Russian infantry, which was at direct throw distance. When I went (or rather, jumped) there after the attack was repelled, the paratroopers told me that they understood that our artillery was firing and that nothing could be done about it. When the fire weakened somewhat, some looked out from the trenches and saw the bodies of the Russians scattering in the air, and the rest of the enemy soldiers in panic trying to dig in. Miraculously, in our company, as a result of that fatal artillery strike, only seven people were killed and several wounded. Several soldiers were covered with earth, but they managed to get out safely.”

Tassonyi was awarded the Iron Cross, first and second class; he and his paratroopers were commended in an order issued by the German Wehrmacht. Nevertheless, the fighting continued until November 22, and during this time the unit lost up to 40 percent of its strength.

Despite the fact that Soviet troops crossed the Tisza in many areas, they were unable to prevent the German side from stabilizing the front, creating a continuous front line by constantly regrouping the remaining forces and delivering continuous attacks on the advancing enemy. The losses on the Soviet side were significant, but by the end of the month the German tank divisions also suffered significant damage. “There were 100–200 soldiers left in the battalions. For every 100 m of front there were an average of 3.5 people... In the tank units there were at best eight tanks, and at worst four or five,” Friesner wrote in his memoirs. By mid-November, the German units deployed northeast of Budapest retreated to the Karol line, and the front in this sector also stabilized.

Stalin finally realized that the forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front alone were not enough to capture Budapest. By his order, on November 14, 200 tanks and 40 thousand soldiers from the reserve of the Supreme High Command, as well as from the 4th Ukrainian Front, “stuck” in the Carpathians, were transferred to Malinovsky’s disposal. The front commander sent armored vehicles, the quantity of which now far exceeded everything available in the German formations, to the 6th Guards Tank Army, which received the task, together with the 7th Army, to encircle Budapest from the north (as was the original plan). However, Soviet troops were unable to break through the enemy’s defenses in this direction.

Attempts by the 46th Army to cross the Danube and land south of the city on the island of Csepel were more successful. On November 6, the same attempt by the forces of one battalion of the 23rd Rifle Corps was stopped by the Hungarian hussars and an assault artillery unit urgently transferred here from near Debrecen (the reason for the transfer was the discovery of a Soviet artillery fire spotter who was hiding in a church bell tower in the south-eastern part of the island) . Hungarian artillery lieutenant Georgi Türosi recalled:

“Soldiers of the Soviet rifle battalion accumulated in shallow water, almost at the very shore of the Old Danube. Having landed, they hid in the willow and birch grove. The one who did not have time to hide was captured by us. Almost all of them were over 40 years old, almost all with large mustaches and simple-minded looks. Our soldiers kindly offered the prisoners rum and patted them on the back in a friendly manner... Such friendliness was able to lure several more Russians out of their shelters. Some were carrying improvised crucifixes made of twigs in their hands... There was a Soviet wounded man, I think a sergeant with a face as white as chalk. I remember very well his firm, petrified gaze and stern face, which did not respond to any friendly gestures, his mouth, twisted in pain. He accepted medical help from us, but never touched the rum offered to him. Wordlessly, he shook his head, refusing the drink. The prisoners asked not to be handed over to the Germans. But the Hungarian army could not have prisoners."

Attacks by Soviet troops attempting to cross the river on November 14, 15, 16 and 18 were repulsed, but on November 21 they landed on Csepel Island with up to a division's strength. The commander of the half-company of the Hungarian 4th Hussars, Tibor Gencz, writes in his memoirs:

“At dawn the next day, the enemy again attempted to cross the Danube branch (Ratskevei-(Shorokshari) - Duna). As a reserve company, we were stationed in one of Thököl's schools. The regiment's officers slept in a righteous sleep. Those who were on the front line, Major Messaros with his men and other units, did not offer the slightest resistance. Enemy troops, perhaps they were penal companies that had managed to drink a fair amount of “assault water,” approached the railway line on the outskirts of the village, where I and my people were standing. They approached in large dense groups, so sometimes one bullet could penetrate two or even three bodies. We reloaded our weapons several times. At some point, they scattered and tried to come to our rear, bypassing the village... Then we were forced out of the village, and the next day there was a counterattack with the support of German tanks. This time the enemy troops managed to properly dig in; they resisted competently and seriously. They were well camouflaged in the trenches, but we found them and killed them with shots to the neck and head. However, it was impossible to completely clear Thököl with our weak forces.”

Concerned about the threat from the south, the command of Army Group South redirected the 2nd Hungarian parachute battalion, the battalion of officer cadets, the battle group of the Feldherrnhalle division, two separate battalions, as well as the 1st and 9th to the island of Csepel artillery battalions. But these forces were clearly not enough to hold back the advance of the Soviet 23rd Rifle Corps, which on November 25 completed the landing on Csepel Island and linked up with the troops of the 37th Rifle Corps. Several villages changed hands at the same time, until finally the front line stabilized between Lakihegy and Kirajerdo on the southern outskirts of the capital. Soviet units continued to advance until they were within range of Hungarian artillery fire, which was supported by river boats. 103 Hungarian guns now had the opportunity to fire at Soviet units not only from the territory of the island of Csepel, but also from Shorokshar in the east, and even from the opposite bank of the Danube in the west. Nevertheless, the fighting continued, and, as a lieutenant of the hussar regiment called up from the reserve recalls, “in the evening, our positions were attacked by the so-called Russian penal battalions, composed of political prisoners (penal battalions were recruited according to other criteria - for offenses committed at the front. - Ed.). Hurricane fire awaited them. Joint volleys of machine guns, mortars, tanks buried in the ground, even high-speed river boats sent bullets and shells at them... The attack soon fizzled out. The Russians suffered huge losses. Hundreds of dying and wounded were left lying in front of our positions. We heard the Russians calling God: “Lord!”, moaning loudly and calling for help. All these sounds became fainter. Our orderlies wanted to help them, but every attempt ended in machine-gun fire from the opposite side. These people were simply left to die. We couldn't help them. The next day we didn’t hear any more groans.”

The general picture of Hungarian losses can be illustrated by the fact that the 2nd Parachute Battalion (approximately 1,400 people) that arrived in this area from the reserve on November 28–29 was almost equal in number to the Hussar Division, which by that time was still fighting in the area Cepel Islands.