Kozlov Dmitry Timofeevich: biography. “Not all names can be named.” Lieutenant General Kozlov - about the Afghan War (6 photos) Great Patriotic War


Commander of the Southern District of the National Guard of the Russian Federation.

Oleg Kozlov was born on April 20, 1963 in the village of Azgir, Stavropol Territory. After graduating from school in 1980, he was drafted into the Soviet Army. In 1984, a young graduate of the Tashkent Tank School was assigned to the 40th Army of the Turkestan Military District as part of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in the Republic of Afghanistan. Then the officer served in Turkmenistan, Hungary and Belarus.

In 1994, the serviceman received additional education, successfully graduating from the Malinovsky Military Academy of Armored Forces. Subsequently, the experienced officer took the position of battalion commander of the 693rd motorized rifle regiment, 58th combined arms army of the North Caucasus Military District. In 1996, Kozlov was appointed deputy commander of the 131st separate motorized rifle brigade in the city of Maykop, Republic of Adygea.

He took direct part in the operation to restore the constitutional order on the territory of the Chechen Republic. Later, by Decree of the President of Russia dated October 19, 1996, Lieutenant Colonel Kozlov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation for the courage and heroism shown during a special task on the territory of the Chechen Republic.

Further, in the early 2000s, the famous military leader was the deputy military commissar of the Omsk region and assistant to the governor of the Stavropol region. In 2004, Oleg Kozlov took up the post of head of the operational control group for combating terrorism in the Stavropol Territory, and three years later he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow District of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for combat training.

In 2009, the officer again increased the level of personal education by completing a course at the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. After two years, after graduating from the academy, Major General Kozlov was appointed deputy commander of the Eastern Regional Command of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for Emergency Situations. In 2012, he took the position of deputy commander of the Volga Regional Command of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs for Emergency Situations.

Four years later, in 2016, Kozlov accepted the post of chief of staff - first deputy commander of the North Caucasus Regional Command of Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Since 2018, Oleg Aleksandrovich has been appointed chief of staff - first deputy commander of the Southern District of the National Guard of the Russian Federation. On March 26, 2018, he took up the post of commander of the Southern District of the Russian National Guard.

Russian President Vladimir Putin June 11, 2019 signed a Decree awarding Oleg Aleksandrovich Kozlov the next military rank of “Colonel General”.

Oleg Kozlov's awards

Awards:

By Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1471 of October 19, 1996, for courage and heroism shown in the performance of military duty, Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Aleksandrovich Kozlov was awarded the title of Hero of the Russian Federation with a special distinction - the Gold Star medal.

Order of Military Merit
Zhukov Medal
Medal "For Distinction in the Protection of Public Order"
Medal "For Strengthening the Military Commonwealth" (Russian Ministry of Defense)
Medal "For Impeccable Service" 1st class
Medal "For Impeccable Service" II degree
Medal "For Impeccable Service" III degree
Medal "200 years of the Ministry of Defense"
Medal "For Merit in Management Activities" II degree
Medal "For Merit in Management Activities" III degree
Medal "200 years of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia"
Personalized weapon

Biography

KOZLOV Dmitry Timofeevich, Soviet military leader, lieutenant general (1940 and 1943). During the First World War, D.T. Kozlov was called up for military service in May 1915 and enlisted in the 211th Infantry Reserve Regiment: private, corporal. In October 1916 he was sent to the front in the active army. Fought in the 150th Taman Infantry Regiment of the 38th Infantry Division on the Western and Northern Fronts: junior and senior non-commissioned officer, platoon commander. In May 1917, he was sent to the school of ensigns of the Northern Front in the city of Gatchina; upon completion in September 1917, he was assigned to the 298th Infantry Regiment, stationed in the Vitebsk province: junior officer, commander of a half-company. From November 1917 he was a member of the company and regimental committees of soldiers' deputies. In February 1918 he was demobilized.

In June 1918, he was drafted into the Red Army and appointed military commander of the Staro-Akhmatovsky volost military registration and enlistment office of the Sergach district of the Nizhny Novgorod province. Since March 1919, assistant to the military commissar of the Sergach district military registration and enlistment office and chairman of the commission to combat desertion. Since October of the same year, he was a battalion commander and assistant commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment of a separate Ufa brigade. As part of the regiment, he took part in battles on the Eastern Front against the troops of Admiral A.V. Kolchak. From January 1920 he commanded the 526th Infantry Regiment of the 59th Infantry Division. In this position, as part of the Semipalatinsk group of troops, he took part in the defeat of the remnants of the White Cossack detachments of Ataman A.I. Dutov and the troops of the Semirechensk Army, Ataman B.V. Annenkova. At the beginning of July 1920, after the disbandment of the division, the 526th Infantry Regiment under the command of D.T. Kozlova became part of the 3rd Turkestan Rifle Division and was reorganized into the 22nd Rifle Regiment. As part of the division, the regiment fought with the Basmachi in the Fergana region. In May 1921, the division became part of the 2nd Turkestan Rifle Division, and the regiment was reorganized into the 16th Rifle Regiment. In February 1923, the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR, on the recommendation of the Military Council of the Turkestan Front D.T. Kozlov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for military services during the Civil War.

In the post-war period, D.T. Kozlov continued to command this regiment. In August 1922, he was appointed commander of the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Turkestan Infantry Division of the Turkestan Front. As part of it he took part in battles with the Basmachi. Since August 1924, he commanded the 109th Infantry Regiment as part of the 37th Infantry Division of the Belarusian Military District (BVO). From October 1925 to June 1928 he studied at the Military Academy of the Red Army named after. M.V. Frunze, upon graduation he was sent to the 46th Infantry Division of the Ukrainian Military District (UVO), where he successively served as chief of staff and division commander. Since November 1930 - head of the Kyiv Infantry School named after. Workers of Red Zamoskvorechye. Since January 1931 - commander and military commissar of the 44th Infantry Division of the UVO. By decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of August 16, 1936, he was awarded the Order of Lenin for high performance in the division’s combat training. In July 1937, he was appointed commander of the 8th Rifle Corps of the Kyiv Military District. From September 1937 to August 1938, he was at the disposal of the Directorate of Command and Command of the Red Army, then was seconded to the Directorate of Combat Training of the Red Army. Since December 1938 - teacher of general tactics at the Military Academy of the Red Army named after. M.V. Frunze. In December 1939 D.T. Kozlov is appointed commander of the 1st Rifle Corps of the Leningrad Military District. In this position, he took part in the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, for which he was awarded the Order of Lenin in May 1940. At the end of hostilities, D.T. Kozlov in April 1940 was appointed deputy commander of the Odessa Military District, and from December of the same year he served as head of the Main Air Defense Directorate of the Red Army. In June 1940, he was awarded the military rank of lieutenant general. In January 1941, he was appointed commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District (ZakVO).

At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the district's troops under his command covered the border with Turkey and two armies - the border with Iran. Since August 1941, the Transcaucasian Front was formed on the basis of the district’s troops with the aim of covering the state borders with Iran and Turkey and defending the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. On December 30, the Transcaucasian Front was renamed the Caucasian Front under the command of Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlova. Front troops from December 25, 1941 to January 2, 1942 successfully carried out the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, as a result of which the Kerch Peninsula was liberated, and part of the enemy forces were diverted from Sevastopol, which eased the position of its defenders. On January 28, 1942, the Caucasian Front was divided into the Crimean Front and the ZakVO. Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov took command of the troops of the Crimean Front and commanded them until May 1942. In May, the enemy went on the offensive and, after fierce fighting, broke through to the city of Kerch. Front troops were forced to leave the Kerch Peninsula and evacuate to the Taman Peninsula; on May 19, 1942, the Crimean Front was disbanded. For the unsuccessful actions of the front troops in the Crimea, by the Headquarters directive of June 4, 1942, D.T. Kozlov was removed from his post and demoted to major general. In June - August 1942, he commanded the 6th and then the 9th reserve armies of the Supreme Command Headquarters, which at the end of August was renamed the 24th Army, included in the Stalingrad Front and participated in the Battle of Stalingrad. During September, its troops carried out an offensive operation with the aim of defeating the enemy group that had broken through to the Volga north of Stalingrad and forced the German command to turn a significant part of the forces of the 6th Field Army to the north, weakening the main group that was attacking directly on Stalingrad. Since October 1942 D.T. Kozlov - assistant, then deputy commander of the Voronezh Front troops for formation. In January - March 1943, he led the actions of the left wing of the front during the Ostro-Gozh-Rossoshanskaya, Voronezh-Kastornenskaya, and Kharkov offensive operations. On January 19, 1943, he was reinstated to the military rank of lieutenant general. From May 1943, he was at the disposal of the State Administration of the NKO; in the period from May 9 to July 15, 1943, he was an authorized representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters on the Leningrad Front. From August 1943 until the end of the war he was deputy commander of the troops of the Trans-Baikal Front. In this position he took part in the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945. , for which he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Banner of the MPR.

After the war, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov held the position of deputy commander for combat units of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District (from May 1947 - Trans-Baikal). From April 1948 to February 1949 he studied at the Higher Attestation Commission at the Higher Military Academy named after. K.E. Voroshilov, upon graduation he was appointed assistant commander of the BVO troops. At the end of June 1954 he was transferred to the reserve.

He was awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

The defeat of the Crimean Front and its subsequent liquidation on May 8-19, 1942 became one of the links in the chain of military disasters of 1942. The scenario during the operation of the Wehrmacht 11th Army under the command of Colonel General Erich von Manstein against the Crimean Front was similar to other German operations of this period. The German troops, having received reinforcements and accumulated forces and resources, launched a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces, which had reached a positional deadlock and suffered significant losses.

On October 18, 1941, the German 11th Army began an operation to capture Crimea. By November 16, the entire peninsula, except for the base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, was captured. In December-January 1941-1942, as a result of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation, the Red Army returned the Kerch Peninsula and advanced 100-110 km in 8 days. But already on January 18, the Wehrmacht recaptured Feodosia. In February-April 1942, the Crimean Front made three attempts to turn the tide of events on the peninsula in its favor, but as a result it was unable to achieve significant success and suffered heavy losses.



Erich von Manstein.

Plans of the German command

As in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, the fighting on the Crimean Peninsula by the spring of 1942 entered the phase of positional warfare. The Wehrmacht made its first attempts to launch a decisive counteroffensive in March 1942. The 11th Army received reinforcements - the 28th Jaeger and 22nd Panzer Divisions. In addition, the Romanian corps received the 4th Mountain Division. The task of defeating the Soviet forces in Crimea was first assigned to the command of the 11th Army on February 12 in the “Order on the conduct of combat operations on the Eastern Front at the end of the winter period” by the main command of the ground forces of the Third Reich. German troops were supposed to capture Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. The German command wanted to free up large forces of the 11th Army for further operations.

With the end of the thaw period, the German armed forces began to move on to implementing this plan. The main guiding document for the German three army groups was Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942. The main targets of the 1942 campaign were the Caucasus and Leningrad. The 11th German Army, which was stuck in positional battles on an isolated section of the Soviet-German front line, was given the task of “clearing the Kerch Peninsula from the enemy in Crimea and capturing Sevastopol.”

In April 1942, at a meeting with Adolf Hitler, Georg von Sonderstern and Manstein presented a plan for the operation of Soviet forces on the Kerch Peninsula. The forces of the Crimean Front were quite densely built on the Parpach Isthmus (at the so-called Ak-Monai positions). But the density of the troops was not the same. The flank of the Crimean Front adjacent to the Black Sea was weaker, and the breakthrough of its positions allowed the Germans to reach the rear of a stronger group of the 47th and 51st armies. The task of breaking through the Soviet positions of the 44th Soviet Army was entrusted to the reinforced XXX Army Corps (AK) of Lieutenant General Maximilian Fretter-Picot, consisting of the 28th Jaeger, 50th Infantry, 132nd Infantry, 170th Infantry, 22 1st tank division. In addition, the German command was going to use the sea-open flank of the Crimean Front and land troops in the rear of the attacked Soviet troops as part of the reinforced battalion of the 426th regiment. XXXXII AK, consisting of the 46th Infantry Division under the command of Infantry General Franz Mattenklott, and the VII Romanian Corps, consisting of the 10th Infantry, 19th Infantry Divisions, 8th Cavalry Brigade, were to conduct a diversionary offensive against the strong right wing of the Crimean Front. The operation was covered from the air by the VIII Air Corps of the Luftwaffe under the command of Baron Wolfram von Richthofen. The operation received the code name “Hunting for the Bustard” (German: Trappenjagd).

The 11th Army was inferior to the Crimean Front (CF): in personnel by 1.6:1 times (250 thousand soldiers of the Red Army against 150 thousand Germans), in guns and mortars by 1.4:1 (3577 in the CF and 2472 for the Germans), 1.9:1 in tanks and self-propelled gun mounts (347 for the KF and 180 for the Germans). Only in aviation there was parity: 1:1, 175 fighters and 225 bombers for the KF, the Germans had 400 units. The most powerful instrument in the hands of Manstein was the VIII Air Corps of von Richthofen's Luftwaffe, it was the most powerful formation of the German Air Force. Richthofen had extensive combat experience - back in the First World War he won eight aerial victories and was awarded the Iron Cross 1st degree, fought in Spain (chief of staff and then commander of the Condor Legion), participant in the Polish and French campaigns, the Cretan operation, participated in Operation Barbarossa and Typhoon (attack on Moscow). In addition, the German army commander had a fresh 22nd Panzer Division under the command of Major General Wilhelm von Apel. The division was formed at the end of 1941 on the territory of the occupied part of France, and it was “full-blooded.” The tank division was armed with Czech PzKpfw 38(t) light tanks. By the beginning of the offensive, the division was reinforced with the 3rd tank battalion (52 tanks), in addition, in April the unit received 15-20 T-3 and T-4. The division had 4 motorized infantry battalions, two of them were equipped with the Ganomag armored personnel carrier and an anti-tank battalion (it also included self-propelled guns).

Manstein had the tools to break through the defenses of the Crimean Front and build on success in the form of the Air Corps and the 22nd Tank Division. After breaking through the front, a tank division could quickly move forward and destroy Soviet reserves, rear lines, and intercept communications. The breakthrough development troops were reinforced by the motorized brigade "Grodek", composed of motorized formations that participated in the offensive operation of the units. Command of the Crimean Front - Commander of the Crimean Fleet, Lieutenant General Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov, members of the Military Council (divisional commissar F.A. Shamanin and secretary of the Crimean Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) V.S. Bulatov, chief of staff Major General P.P. Vechny, representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command L . Z. Mehlis), had only tank units for direct support of infantry (tank brigades and battalions) and did not create means of countering the deep penetration of the Germans - army mobile groups consisting of tank, anti-tank, mechanized, and cavalry formations. We must also take into account the fact that the front line was completely open to aerial reconnaissance; it was an open steppe. The Germans easily opened the positions of the Soviet troops.

Plans of the Soviet command, forces of the Crimean Front

The Soviet command, despite the fact that the tasks of the winter offensive were not completed, did not want to lose the initiative, and did not lose hope of changing the situation in their favor. On April 21, 1942, the Main Command of the North Caucasus direction was formed, headed by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. Budyonny was subordinated to the Crimean Front, the Sevastopol defensive region, the North Caucasus Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla.

The Crimean Front occupied defensive positions on the rather narrow Ak-Monai Isthmus, 18-20 km wide. The front consisted of three armies: the 44th under the command of Lieutenant General Stepan Ivanovich Chernyak, the 47th Army under Major General Konstantin Stepanovich Kolganov, and the 51st Army under Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov. In total, by the beginning of May, the command of the CF headquarters included 16 rifle and 1 cavalry divisions, 3 rifle, 4 tank, 1 naval brigade, 4 separate tank battalions, 9 artillery regiments of the RGK and other formations. The front in February–April 1942 suffered serious losses, was largely drained of blood, exhausted, and did not have fresh and powerful strike formations. As a result, the CF, although it had a numerical advantage in people, tanks, guns and mortars, was inferior in terms of quality.

The asymmetric formation of the CF troops further equalized the capabilities of the Soviet and German commands. The CF positions were divided into two segments unevenly filled with troops. The southern section from Koi-Aisan to the Black Sea coast, about 8 km long, represented Soviet defensive positions prepared back in January 1942. They were defended by the 276th Rifle, 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions of the 44th Army (A). In the second echelon and reserve were the 396th, 404th, 157th rifle divisions, 13th motorized rifle regiment, 56th tank brigade (as of May 8 - 7 KV, 20 T-26, 20 T-60), 39th Tank Brigade (2 KV, 1 T-34, 18 T-60), 126th Separate Tank Battalion (51 T-26), 124th Separate Tank Battalion (20 T-26). The northern section from Koi-Aisan to Kiet (about 16 km) curved to the west, hanging over Feodosia, which, according to the plans of the Soviet command, was the first target of the offensive. In this ledge and in the immediate vicinity of it, the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies of the CF were assembled, reinforced by troops subordinate to the front headquarters. In the first echelon were the 271st, 320th rifle divisions, 77th mountain rifle division 47th A, 400th, 398th, 302nd rifle divisions 51A, 55th tank brigade (10 KV, 20 T-26, 16 T-60), 40th Tank Brigade (11 KV, 6 T-34, 25 T-60). In the second echelon and reserve: 224th, 236th rifle divisions of the 47th A, 138th, 390th rifle divisions of the 51st A, 229th separate tank battalion (11 KV) and other units.

As a result of the command front, Dmitry Kozlov gathered the main forces of the CF on his right flank, but they got stuck in positional battles and lost mobility. In addition, the Germans were able to take advantage of the pause between the previous and the upcoming new Soviet offensive. Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 170357 to the command of the CF on the transition to defense was late; there was no time to regroup forces, dismantling the strike group on the right flank in favor of strengthening the positions of the left flank. The German command, having assembled a strike force on its right flank opposite the positions of the 44th A, did not hesitate.

According to the initial plan of the command of Army Group South, Operation Bustard Hunt was supposed to begin on May 5. But due to a delay in the transfer of aircraft, the start of the offensive operation was postponed to May 8. It cannot be said that the German attack was a complete surprise for the CF command. Shortly before the start of the German offensive, a Croatian pilot flew over to the Soviet side and reported an upcoming attack. By the end of May 7, an order was issued to the front troops, which stated that a German offensive was expected on May 8-15, 1942. But there was no time for a correct reaction.

Battle

May 7. The VIII Luftwaffe Air Corps was soon to return to the Kharkov area to participate in the operation to eliminate the Barvenkovo ​​salient. Therefore, air strikes began a day before the German 11th Army went on the offensive. All day the German Air Force attacked headquarters and communications centers. It must be said that the actions of German aviation during this operation were very successful, for example, during a raid on the headquarters of the 51st Army on May 9, Lieutenant General, Army Commander Vladimir Lvov was killed. Soviet command posts were scouted in advance and suffered heavy losses. Troop control was partially disrupted.

May 8. At 4.45, aviation and artillery preparation began. At 7.00, units of the 28th Jaeger, 132nd Infantry Divisions of the 30th AK went on the offensive on the German right flank. The main blow fell on the orders of the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division and partly the 276th Rifle Division of the 44th A. In addition, the Germans landed troops up to a battalion in the rear of the 63rd Georgian Mountain Rifle Division, causing panic. By the end of the day, German units broke through the defenses at a front of 5 km and to a depth of 8 km.

At 20.00 Kozlov ordered a flank counterattack on the enemy units that had broken through. The forces of the 51st A on the morning of May 9 were supposed to strike from the line between the village of Parpach and the city of Syuruk-Oba in the direction of the Peschanaya gully. The strike group included 4 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades and 2 separate tank battalions: the 302nd, 138th and 390th rifle divisions from the 51st A, the 236th rifle division from the 47th A, the 83rd naval rifle brigade, 40th and 55th tank brigades, 229th and 124th separate tank battalions. They received the task of restoring the position of the front and developing the offensive, cutting off the German units that had broken through deep into the Kerch Peninsula. The 44th Army was supposed to hold back the onslaught of the Germans at this time. No one had yet thought about retreating to the rear defensive lines on the first day of the battle. There were no orders for their occupation. Moreover, the 72nd Cavalry Division and the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which were subordinate to the front headquarters and located near the Turkish Wall, received orders to move into the 44th A zone to strengthen its defense.

9th May. The German command brought the 22nd Panzer Division into the breakthrough, but the onset of rains greatly slowed its progress. Only by the 10th was the tank division able to break into the depths of the KF defense and turn to the north, reaching the communications of the 47th and 51st Soviet armies. The tank division was followed by the 28th Jaeger Division and the 132nd Infantry Division. Grodek's motorized rifle brigade was also thrown into the breakthrough - on May 10 it reached the Turkish Wall and crossed it.

May 10. On the night of May 10, during negotiations between front commander Kozlov and Stalin, it was decided to withdraw the army to the Turkish (in other sources Tatar) shaft and organize a new line of defense. But the 51st Army was no longer able to carry out this order. As a result of an airstrike on the headquarters, Army Commander Lvov was killed and his deputy K. Baranov was wounded. The army frantically tried to avoid disaster. Units of the 47th and 51st armies launched a planned counterattack on May 9, and there was a fierce oncoming battle. Soviet tank brigades and separate tank battalions, rifle units fought against formations of the 22nd Tank Division and the 28th Jaeger Division. The intensity of the fighting is evidenced by the fact that if on May 9 the 55th Tank Brigade had 46 tanks, then after the battle on May 10 there was only one left. Soviet tank infantry support units were unable to contain the onslaught of German forces.

May 11-12. On the afternoon of May 11, units of the 22nd Tank Division reached the Sea of ​​Azov, cutting off significant forces of the 47th and 51st armies from the retreat route to the Turkish Wall. Several Soviet divisions were surrounded in a narrow coastal strip. On the evening of the 11th, the Soviet high command still hoped to restore the situation on the peninsula by creating a defensive line on the Turkish Wall. Stalin and Vasilevsky order Budyonny to personally organize the defense of the KF troops, restore order in the Military Council of the front, and for this purpose go to Kerch. The left flank divisions of the 51st Soviet Army spent another day unsuccessfully trying to prevent the encirclement of other troops, lost time and lost the race to the rear line of defense.

The Germans did not waste time and did everything to prevent the Soviet troops from retreating to a new line of defense. By the end of the 10th, the advanced units of the 30th AK reached the Turkish Wall. On May 12, the Germans landed troops in the rear of the 44th Army. This allowed them to begin a successful fight for the Turkish Wall before the reserve 156th Infantry Division approached the rampart.

May 13 and subsequent days. On May 13, the Germans broke through the defenses in the center of the Turkish Wall. On the night of the 14th, the Supreme High Command Headquarters admitted defeat on the Kerch Peninsula. At 3.40 Budyonny, with the consent of Headquarters, ordered the withdrawal of CF troops to the Taman Peninsula. Vasilevsky orders the 2nd and 3rd airborne corps and the airborne brigade to be put at Budyonny’s disposal. Apparently, it was planned to organize a defense on the approaches to Kerch by landing troops and stop the German advance in order to withdraw the troops of the defeated CF. Moreover, they were not going to surrender Kerch - this meant burying all the results of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. On May 15 at 1.10 A.M. Vasilevsky orders: “Don’t surrender Kerch, organize defense like Sevastopol.”

The advanced German units, apparently this was Grodek's motorized brigade, reached the outskirts of Kerch on May 14. The city was defended by units of the 72nd Cavalry Division. This was announced at 18.10 by the representative of the Headquarters on the Crimean Front, Lev Zakharovich Mehlis: “The fighting is on the outskirts of Kerch, the city is being surrounded by the enemy from the north... We have disgraced the country and should be damned. We will fight to the last. Enemy aircraft decided the outcome of the battle.”

But measures to transform Kerch into a fortress city and withdraw most of the forces from the peninsula were too late. First, the Germans cut off a significant part of the CF troops by turning the formations of the 22nd Panzer Division to the north. True, they wanted to send it to Kharkov on May 15, but the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops on the peninsula delayed its dispatch. Units of the 28th Jaeger and 132nd Infantry Divisions turned to the northeast after the breakthrough of the Turkish Wall and also reached the Sea of ​​Azov. Thus, a barrier was built to the Soviet troops who were retreating from the Turkish Wall. On May 16, the 170th German Infantry Division, introduced into the breakthrough, reached Kerch. But the battle for the city continued until May 20. The Red Army soldiers fought in the area of ​​Mount Mithridates, the railway station, and the plant named after. Voikova. After the defenders exhausted all possibilities of resistance in the city, they retreated to the Adzhimushkai quarries. About 13 thousand people retreated to them - formations of the 83rd Marine Brigade, the 95th Border Detachment, several hundred cadets of the Yaroslavl Aviation School, the Voronezh School of Radio Specialists and soldiers from other units, citizens. In the Central quarries, the defense was led by Colonel P. M. Yagunov, senior battalion commissar I. P. Parakhin and Lieutenant Colonel G. M. Burmin, in Small quarries - Lieutenant Colonel A. S. Ermakov, senior lieutenant M. G. Povazhny, battalion commissar M N. Karpekhin. The Germans, through continuous attacks, were able to drive the Red Army soldiers deep into the quarries. But they couldn’t take them; all the assaults failed. Despite the acute shortage of water, food, medicine, and ammunition, the soldiers held the line for 170 days. There was no water in the quarries. It had to be obtained from outside; according to the recollections of surviving soldiers, “they paid for a bucket of water with a bucket of blood.” The last defenders of Kerch Brest, completely exhausted, were captured on October 30, 1942. In total, 48 people fell into the hands of the Germans. The rest, approximately 13 thousand people, died.

The evacuation from the peninsula continued from May 15 to 20. By order of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, all possible ships and vessels were brought to the Kerch area. In total, up to 140 thousand people were evacuated. Commissioner Lev Mehlis was one of the last to evacuate, on the evening of May 19. In the last days of the disaster, as a man of undoubted personal courage, he rushed along the front line, it seemed as if he was looking for death, trying to organize a defense and stop the retreating units. On the night of May 20, the last formations, covering the retreat of their comrades, boarded the ships under enemy fire.

Results

By directive of the Headquarters, the Crimean Front and the North Caucasus direction were eliminated. The remnants of the CF troops were sent to form a new North Caucasus Front. Marshal Budyonny was appointed its commander.

The front lost more than 160 thousand people. Most of the planes, armored vehicles, guns, vehicles, tractors and other military equipment were lost. Soviet troops suffered a heavy defeat, the results of previous actions in this direction were lost. The situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front became seriously complicated. The Germans were able to threaten an invasion of the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula. The position of the Soviet troops in Sevastopol sharply deteriorated; the German command was able to concentrate more forces against the fortress city.

On June 4, 1942, Headquarters Directive No. 155452 “On the reasons for the defeat of the Crimean Front in the Kerch Operation” was issued. The main reason was said to be the mistakes of the CF command. The front commander, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, was demoted to major general and removed from the post of front commander. The commander of the 44th Army, Lieutenant General S.I. Chernyak, was removed from the post of army commander, demoted to colonel and sent to the troops with the goal of “testing himself in another, less complex job.” The commander of the 47th Army, Major General K. S. Kolganov, was removed from the post of army commander and demoted to colonel. Mekhlis was removed from his posts as deputy people's commissar of defense and head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, and demoted two levels in rank - to corps commissar. Member of the Military Council of the KF, divisional commissar F.A. Shamanin was demoted to the rank of brigade commissar. The chief of staff of the CF, Major General P.P. Vechny, was removed from the post of chief of staff of the front. The commander of the KF Air Force, Major General E.M. Nikolaenko, was removed from his post and demoted to colonel.

The disaster of the Crimean Front is a classic example of the weakness of the defensive strategy, even in the conditions of a small, rather convenient for defense (the Germans could not conduct wide outflanking maneuvers) section of the front and a smaller number of manpower, tanks and guns from the enemy. The German command found a weak point and ripped open the Soviet defense; the presence of mobile, attack formations (22nd Panzer Division and Grodek's motorized brigade) made it possible to develop the first success, encircle the Soviet infantry, destroy the rear, separate formations, and cut off communications. Air superiority played a big role. The command of the KF did not have time to rebuild the front troops into more correct defensive formations (without bias in favor of the right flank), to create mobile strike groups that, by striking the flanks of the breakthrough German group, could stop the German advance and even turn the situation in their favor. It failed to prepare a new line of defense in advance and to divert forces and resources to it. During this period of the war, German generals continued to outmaneuver the Soviet generals.


Adzhimushkai_quarries - entrance to the museum.

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On October 3, 2017, Police Major General Vyacheslav Kozlov was relieved of his position as Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Moscow - Chief of Police due to reaching the age limit for serving in the internal affairs bodies. Vyacheslav Alekseevich expressed his readiness to continue working in the police as a federal civil servant.

For 45 long years, the work of Vyacheslav Alekseevich Kozlov has been inextricably linked with work in the metropolitan police, and previously the police. The head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Moscow, Major General of Police Oleg Baranov, noted in his speech that Vyacheslav Alekseevich is an initiative and competent leader with extensive professional experience, excellent organizational skills, and has the endurance and efficiency necessary for a leader. During his service, he gained well-deserved authority among his colleagues; he is distinguished by respect for people, tact and delicacy in working with subordinates.

Today, his students work in senior positions in the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for the city of Moscow, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, as well as the Russian Guard, added Oleg Anatolyevich.

Vyacheslav Alekseevich began serving in the police in 1972. For three years, Sergeant Kozlov, as a policeman in the operational regiment of the Moscow police, worked in the public order premises on Red Square and provided access to Lenin’s mausoleum. Vyacheslav Alekseevich took an active part in maintaining public order at the Olympic Games in 1980. He graduated from the Secondary Specialized Police School, became an officer, platoon commander, and then deputy company commander of an operational regiment. In 1984 he graduated from the Moscow Faculty of Legal Education at the Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR with a degree in Jurisprudence.

In 1988, due to the growing instability in the country, special police units were created by government decision. Vyacheslav Kozlov became deputy commander of the capital's riot police and held this position for 10 years. Since 1998, he led the detachment for many years during difficult periods in the life of our country.

Since 2007, Police Major General Kozlov has been the deputy head of the Moscow City Internal Affairs Directorate - the head of the public security police. In 2011, he was appointed Deputy Chief of Police - Head of the Public Order Directorate of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Moscow with the rank of “Major General of Police.”

The biography of Vyacheslav Kozlov notes that he repeatedly took part in performing operational and service tasks in the North Caucasus region of the Russian Federation. The combined detachment under his leadership always carried out a combat mission and, most importantly, returned home in full force. For his courage and heroism, he was awarded state awards - the Order “For Personal Courage”, the Order of Courage, the Order of Honor, the medal “For Excellent Service in the Protection of Public Order”, as well as other departmental awards, and is an honored employee of the internal affairs bodies of the Russian Federation. Vyacheslav Alekseevich is a good family man; he raised two sons who successfully serve in the internal affairs bodies in leadership positions.

At the meeting, a documentary film about the most striking events in the biography of Vyacheslav Kozlov was shown.

Warm and sincere words of gratitude addressed to Vyacheslav Alekseevich were heard from the heads of the capital’s police.

Not only colleagues, but also the personnel of the Moscow garrison units unanimously recognize that the professionalism, experience and authority of Vyacheslav Kozlov are a shining example and role model for both young employees and current managers at various levels.

Taking into account his wealth of knowledge and vast practical experience, a decision was made to appoint Vyacheslav Kozlov to the position of assistant to the head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Moscow in the area of ​​protecting public order and ensuring public safety during major sports, public and socio-political events.

Police Major General Oleg Baranov presented Vyacheslav Alekseevich with a memorable gift and a new service ID as an assistant to the head of the Main Directorate.

Vyacheslav Kozlov expressed deep gratitude to the leadership of the capital’s headquarters for the high assessment of his activities, and in conclusion said:

For me, work in the Moscow police has always been task-oriented. During the service there were moments when I did not feel sorry for someone, but I always took care of everyone. After all, the most important thing is to always remain in service and return home alive. The head of the main department entrusted me with a new position, and I will continue to serve and share my experience with young people, help solve the problems facing the Moscow police.

Sergey VOLOGODSKY, press service of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia for Moscow, photo by Antonin BASTAKOV

Commander of the 47th Missile Division 11/30/1976 - 07/02/1981

Commander of the 50th RA from November 15, 1985 to August 3, 1988.

Born in the Urals in 1937. Graduated from the Irkutsk Military Aviation School (1958), Rostov VKIU (1966), Military Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1982). In the Strategic Missile Forces - since 1966.

Served in the following positions: commander of the launch group; chief of staff, regiment commander; chief of staff, division commander: deputy commander of the missile army for combat training.

In the 50th Missile Army, General G.V. Kozlov arrived as chief of army staff, and after the departure of General N.N. Kotlovtsev was promoted to commander of the 50th Smolensk Rocket Army.

Lieutenant General G.V. Kozlov was distinguished by his high demands, energy and determination. He paid a lot of attention to monitoring performance, general training of army command officers, division and regiment commanders, improving combat command and control of troops, and tried to thoroughly know the real state of affairs on the ground. He practiced sudden inspections of formations and units, taking direct part in them. Skillfully led the departments and services of the army, taking into account the work experience they had accumulated, supporting the initiative and creativity of his subordinates.

Under Lieutenant General G.V. Kozlov, the army began to implement measures related to the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the USA on medium- and short-range missiles.

In 1986, the 50th RA participated in the exercise of the USSR Minister of Defense with the actual deployment of the Pioneer SPU in new field positions with the crossing of the water barrier of the Neman River using a built pontoon crossing.

Awarded the Order of the Red Star, “For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR” 2nd and 3rd degree, and many medals.

Lieutenant General G.V. Kozlov died suddenly in August 1988. He was buried in Smolensk.

(07/15/1937, Novopovalikha village, Altai Territory - 08/3/1988, Smolensk), lieutenant general (1985), commander of the missile army (from 1985 to 1988). Graduated from the Irkutsk Military Aviation Technical School (1952), Rostov Higher Command and Engineering School named after. M.I. Nedelin (1966), academic courses at the Military Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1974), Military Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (in absentia, 1982, with a gold medal), Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff (1984).

In the Missile Forces since 1966: commander of the launch group; chief of staff, commander of a missile regiment; chief of staff, commander of a missile division; deputy commander of the missile army for combat training; chief of staff of the missile army, commander of the missile army.

Awarded: Order of the Red Star (1978), “For service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Forces” 2 tbsp. (1978), 3 art. (1975) and medals.

(15.07.09.1937 - 03.08.1988)

Commander of the 50th Missile Army in 1985-1988.

Gennady Vasilievich Kozlov was born in the Urals in 1937. He graduated from the Irkutsk Military Aviation School (1958), Rostov VKIU (1966), and the Military Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1982). In the Strategic Missile Forces since 1966.

Served in the following positions: commander of the launch group; chief of staff, regiment commander; chief of staff, division commander; Deputy Commander of the Missile Army for Combat Training.

To the 50th Missile Army G.V. Kozlov arrived as chief of army staff, and after N.N. left. Kotlovtsev was promoted to commander of the 50th Smolensk Rocket Army.

V. Kozlov was distinguished by high demands, energy and determination, and an ascetic character. He paid a lot of attention to monitoring performance and tried to thoroughly know the real state of affairs on the ground. He paid a lot of attention to the combined arms training of army command and control officers, division and regiment commanders, and to improving combat command and control of troops.

He practiced sudden inspections of formations and units, taking direct part in them. Skillfully led the departments and services of the army, taking into account the work experience they had accumulated, supporting the initiative and creativity of his subordinates.

Under Lieutenant General G.V. Kozlov, the army began to implement measures related to the signing of an agreement between the USSR and the USA on medium- and short-range missiles.

He died suddenly in August 1988. He was buried in Smolensk.

Graduated from: Irkutsk Military Aviation Technical School (1952), Rostov Higher Military Command and Engineering School (1966), Military Engineering Academy named after. F.E. Dzerzhinsky (1982, in absentia with a gold medal).

Served in the Missile Forces since 1961 in the following positions: commander of the launch group, chief of staff, commander of the missile regiment, chief of staff of the division, commander of the 47th RD, deputy commander of the 53rd Missile Army for combat training, chief of staff of the 50th RA, commander of the 50th Missile Army with 1985 to 1988

From November 1976 to July 1981, the following events took place in the 47th Missile Division. The division took part in combat training launches of missiles in the interests of creating the country's missile defense system under the Duga-1 program.

During 1977-1978 Two missile regiments were involved in carrying out combat training launches. A total of 16 launches were carried out. For the first time in the history of the Missile Forces, a salvo launch consisting of four launchers and a group launch involving five launchers were carried out.

While still the chief of staff of the 47th rd Colonel G.V. Kozlov did a lot of work preparing and conducting launches under the Duga-1 program. So during 1975-1976. Three R-16U missile regiments (9 launchers) and one UR-100K regiment (2 launchers) were involved in this task.

In addition to tasks in the interests of missile defense, the launches were aimed at testing the reliability of missiles and technical systems of ground equipment of the “old” R-16U missile system with silo launchers.

In total, from 1968 to 1978, 86 combat training launches were carried out from the position area of ​​47 rd.

Taking into account the tense situation that actually developed in the mid-seventies of the last century in the East of our country, the command of the Missile Forces, the 53rd Missile Army and directly the commander of the 47th Rd are taking additional measures to increase survivability, strengthen the security and defense of the division’s facilities.

Since 1975, the formation has been working to strengthen the security and defense of combat starting positions and command posts by equipping them with additional fire weapons: tank firing points (buried T-34 tank), anti-aircraft launchers, anti-aircraft machine guns "U tes", P3RK "Strela-2M". Located on the first and second lines of the outer perimeter of the position area facing the border with China, they are equipped, respectively, with two and one fixed tank firing points. A separate anti-aircraft missile division is being added to the division. Security and defense work in the division was carried out throughout the second half of the 70s, mainly due to the arrival of tank weapons, Utes machine guns and Strela-2M MANPADS.

Since December 1976, the division has been transitioning to a unified system of organizing and performing combat duty for 3-4 days.

In 1977, due to the expiration of the warranty period, the launchers of two R-16U missile regiments were removed from combat duty and dismantled. The division still has 9 OS missile regiments in its combat strength. 90 launchers.

In 1980, a separate aviation squadron of the division was included in the Book of Honor of the Military Council of the Missile Forces. Without a doubt, these awards and encouragements include a large share of the work of the division commander, Major General G.V. Kozlova

In June 1981, Major General G.V. Kozlov was appointed deputy commander of the 53rd Missile Army for combat training, in August 1982 - chief of staff of the 50th RA, and in 1985 - commander of the 50th RA.

Lieutenant General Gennady Vasilyevich Kozlov died suddenly on August 3, 1988. He was buried in Smolensk.